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Abstract
In this thesis, I study the interactions between various aspects of the financial system
and macroeconomic volatility in a globally integrated environment. In Chapter 1, I
illustrate that an efficient allocation of liquidity across projects mitigates the econ-
omy's responsiveness to global liquidity supply shocks. Emerging economies in which
the allocation of liquidity is distorted serve as a buffer zone that insulates developed
economies from shocks to global liquidity supply. This suggests that, when function-
ing properly, the financial system in the developed world increases its stability by
facilitating the efficient allocation of liquidity. However, I illustrate that in a global
environment in which funding is cheap, the financial system will endogenously dete-
riorate and cease to carryout this role effectively. The conclusion is twofold: first, an
efficient allocation of liquidity has a stabilizing effect on macroeconomic fluctuations.
Second, in a low interest rate environment, the economy cannot rely on the financial
system to maintain the capacity to implement ain efficient allocation.
In Chapter 2, I suggest that intermediation need not be necessary in order to
achieve ain efficient allocation of liquidity; by setting an appropriately high tax on
production or subsidy on unproductive savings, the government can manipulate the
equilibrium prices of production inputs such that an efficient allocation of resources
is achieved. Compared to the optimal policy benchmark, the equilibrium financial
system absorbs too many productive resources. Further, the mere existence of a
financial system induces unnecessary macroeconomic volatility in the form of liquidity
shortages and surges in unemployment. I conclude that while the efficient allocation
of liquidity is inportant both for the level of output and for output stability. financial
intermediation is an inferior way to achieve it.
In Chapter 3, I study the distributional implications of allowing for the inter-
mediation of liquidity from developed to emerging economies. Liquidity suppliers
from developed economies extract rents from supplying liquidity to constrained en-
trepreneurs in emerging markets. Financial integration is therefore associated with
a regressive transfer of surplus from emerging to developed economies. Further, as
input prices in emerging economies appreciate following the inflow of liquidity, produc-
ers in emerging economies become increasingly reliant on foreign liquidity; a sudden
reluctance of foreigners to supply liquidity results in a drop in output and consump-
tion. Financial integration therefore not only decreases equilibrium consumption in
emerging economies., but also increases the volatility of consumption due to shocks
to external funding.
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Chapter 1
Financial Distortions and the
Distribution of Global Volatility
Abstract
A generic feature of financial frictions, whatever their origins may be, is that they
distort the allocation of funds to projects, causing some less productive projects to be
funded while more productive projects are not. I formalize this idea by introducing
a log supermodularity condition which requires that, at the margin, the difference
in productivity between funded and unfunded projects is smaller in more distorted
economies. Using this condition, I then revisit the relationship between financial dis-
tortions and macroeconomic volatility. My first set of results establishes that financial
integration shifts the margin of adjustment to global liquidity shocks disproportion-
ately to financially distorted regions, thereby providing a new and simple explanation
for the divergent trends in the volatility of emerging and developed economies up to
the recent crisis. My second set of results shows that a global environment in which
liquidity is cheap is conducive to a deterioration of the financial system in the (level-
oped world. While cheap liquidity increases and stabilizes output in that region., it
amplifies large adverse shocks.
JEL Classification: E44, F36, GO1, G15
Keywords: financial distortions, log supermodularity, emerging market volatility,
the Great Moderation, financial crises
1.1 Introduction
How does financial integration between emerging and developed economies affect
the global distribution of output volatility? Why are shocks to external funding
an important source of crises in emerging markets, but typically irrelevant in the
developed world? What was the role (if any) of financial integration with emerging
markets in setting the stage for the subprime crisis?
In this paper I develop a simple model of financial distortions to address these
questions. I present two sets of results: first, I show that financial integration shifts
the margin of adjustment to fluctuations in liquidity supply disproportionately from
developed to emerging economies. In other words, shocks to external funding are an
important source of crises in emerging markets because they are typically irrelevant in
the developed world. Second, I show that a global environment in which liquidity is
cheap is conducive to the deterioration of the financial system in developed economies.
The deterioration of the financial system will amplify large contractions in liquidity
supply; however, it will actually serve to increase and stabilize output during nor-
mal times. The model therefore generates volatility patterns that are consistent both
with the amplification of the subprime crisis and with the euphoric pre-crisis environ-
ment, and suggests that financial integration with emerging economies may have led
to endogenous structural changes in the financial system that set the stage for the
subprime crisis.
The notion of financial distortions central to my simple model builds on the fol-
lowing idea. Regardless of whether distortions originate from collateral constraints,
informational asymmetries or search frictions, financial distortions cause unproduc-
tive projects to be implemented before more productive projects. Because of this,
the return to the marginal units of funding is relatively higher in more distorted
economies. Stated formally, the marginal product of funds is log supermodular in
funds and the level of distortion.
This simple condition has rich macroeconomic implications. An attractive feature
of this approach is that it clearly disentangles the macroeconomic implications of
financial distortions from their micro source, emphasizing the generality of the former.
More importantly, this approach isolates a particular feature of financial distortions
that is relevant for understanding macroeconomic volatility. For example, this feature
is tightly linked to the amplification of liquidity supply shocks: in more distorted
economies, the marginal units of funding are relatively more important, as they are
used to implement relatively more productive projects.
I embed this notion of financial distortions in a general equilibrium framework.
Working capital is the single input of production and is determined by a fluctuat-
ing liquidity supply. In reduced form, a more distorted economy can be represented
simply as an economy with a less steeply declining marginal product of working cap-
ital. The first result is that, holding the levels of financial distortions fixed, financial
integration shifts the margin of adjustment to fluctuations in liquidity supply dispro-
portionately to emerging economies, mitigating the effect of shocks to the supply of
funding on the developed world. This result is closely tied to the assumption that
financial distortions are more prevalent in emerging markets: compared to developed
economies, implemented projects are less productive and unimplemented projects are
more productive. A contraction in global liquidity supply will therefore lead to a
disproportionate contraction in the amount of implemented projects, as relatively
fewer previously-implemented projects are able to meet more stringent borrowing
requirements. Similarly, an expansion in global liquidity supply will lead to a dis-
proportionate expansion in the amount of implemented projects, as relatively more
previously-unimplemented projects generate returns high enough to justify imple-
mentation. The equilibrium counterpart of emerging markets' vulnerability to shocks
to external funding is a decline in liquidity-driven output fluctuations in developed
economies. Emerging economies essentially serve as a buffer zone insulating developed
economies from shocks to their own domestic liquidity supply.
This result proposes a novel link between the vulnerability of emerging economies
to shocks to external funding, and the moderation of liquidity-driven output fluctu-
ations in the developed world prior to the recent crisis. There is a vast literature
emphasizing the role of international capital flows as a source of heightened volatility
in emerging markets. Evidence suggests that emerging markets are more sensitive
to shocks to the global supply of funds, and that, because of this, financial inte-
gration increases volatility in emerging market economies 2 . At the aggregate level,
the last three decades, which have been characterized by rapid financial integration,
have also been characterized by a divergence in the volatility levels of emerging and
developed economies. Figures 1-4 and 1-5 plot the trends of the absolute value of
the output gap (calculated based on a linear trend) in the developed and emerging
market regions3 . While the volatility of output has increased in the emerging market
region, output volatility in the developed world has experienced a steep and steady
decline, commonly referred to as the Great Moderation. As demonstrated by struc-
tural VAR analysis in Gali and Gambetti [2009], this decline seems to be attributed
to the contribution of non-technology shocks, which, in the context of this model, can
be interpreted as shocks to the supply of funding. The model in this paper suggests
that these diverging trends can be explained as an equilibrium outcome of financial
integration, holding the qualities of financial institutions fixed.
I extend the model to allow for the degree of financial distortions in the developed
world to endogenously adjust to the financially integrated environment. Banks choose
the level of financial distortions, where a more efficient allocation is associated with
a higher cost. The second set of results relates to the idea that large flows of capi-
tal towards the developed world led to an endogenous deterioration of the financial
system. In this model, the equilibrium level of financial distortions increases endoge-
nously with financial integration. Intuitively, when liquidity is cheap most projects
should be implemented anyway; the returns to sustaining institutions which enable
See Broner and Ventura [2010], Uribe and Yue [2006], Fostel and Geanakoplos [2008], Neumeyer
and Perri [2005], Fernandez-Villaverde et al. [2009] and Chang and Fernandez [2010].
2Examining a large panel of both emerging and developed markets that liberalized since the 1980s,
Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache [1999] document that the financial fragility induced by financial
integration decreases with the quality of financial institutions. Stiglitz [2000] argues that financial
liberalization in emerging markets is associated with more extreme shifts in capital flows, which make
them more susceptible both to unsustainable boom and appreciation episodes, and to sudden stops.
Further evidence of the fragility induced by financial integration in emerging markets is the drastic
measures these economies take in order to insure against sudden stops and stabilize capital flows
(for example, by accumulating large reserves, as documented by Caballero and Panageas [2005]).
3 See Hakura [2007] for a more detailed discussion of volatility trends in emerging and developed
economies.
differential implementation of projects based on their returns is low, so intermediaries
as well as regulators may choose to refrain from doing so. In this model, these insti-
tutional changes have a mixed effect on output volatility: while they amplify large
adverse shocks, they actually serve to increase and stabilize output during normal
times, a feature consistent with the tranquil and prosperous pre-crisis environment.
Intuitively, increased reliance on the implementation of low-quality projects makes the
implementation of these projects worthwhile even in the presence of small shocks4 .
However, a large enough shock that deems the implementation of low-quality projects
unprofitable entails an inevitable domino effect, as the implementation of productive
projects must contract as well.
These findings suggest a role for financial integration in setting the stage for
the subprime crisis. It has been suggested that low interest rates and high demand
for US assets have led to the loosening of lending standards and various structural
changes in the financial system that increased the relative importance of low-quality
loans, such as increased securitization and increased reliance on securitized products
in banks' balance sheets5 . Interestingly, while these structural changes may have
evidently amplified the shock to housing prices (as suggested by Brunnermeier [2009]
and Gorton [2008]), they did not immediately lead to a crisis. Rather, capital flows to
the developed world remained high and increasing as the financial system underwent
these structural changes. In the context of this model, these puzzling dynamics can
be rationalized by the mixed implications of a deterioration in the financial system
with respect to small and large shocks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 1.2 I discuss the related
literature. In section 1.3 I introduce a novel reduced-form formulation of financial
distortions, and present examples of microfoundations consistent with this formula-
tion. In section 3.4 I embed the notion of financial distortions in a simple general
equilibrium model, and characterize the closed economy equilibrium. In section 1.5 I
4This feature of the model is consistent with the findings of Keys et al. [2008], according to which
increased securitization led to the loosening of lending standards and increased implementation of
low-quality projects.
5 See Brunnermeier [2009] and Gorton [2008].
consider the effects of financial integration between a distorted emerging market re-
gion and an undistorted developed market region. In section 1.6 I extend the model
in section 1.5 to allow for a deterioration of the quality of the financial system in the
developed world. I show that a decline in the price of liquidity may cause a deterio-
ration in the quality of the financial system, and discuss the implications for output
and output volatility. In section 3.8 I conclude.
1.2 Related Literature
In this section, I discuss the related literature and clarify the contribution of this
paper relative to others.
The results concerning the divergence in volatility between emerging and devel-
oped economies are related to several strands of literature. The idea that financial
distortions exacerbate output volatility appears prominently in the context of col-
lateral constraints. Kiyotaki and Moore [1997], Fostel and Geanakoplos [2008] and
Caballero and Krishnamurthy [2001] are important examples, the latter two with
specific applications to emerging market economies. The general formulation in this
paper suggests that the link between financial distortions and volatility is not unique
to collateral constraints, and is common to many forms of distortions. The mecha-
nism in this paper is closest to Kiyotaki and Moore [1997], as the amplification of
shocks through the financial system is a result of a domestic inefficient allocation
of resources. However, the role of external funding in explaining emerging market
volatility is closest to Fostel and Geanakoplos [2008]. In Fostel and Geanakoplos
[2008], a small group of constrained investors hold emerging market assets. Shocks to
the liquidity in the hands of these investors evidently translate into movements in the
liquidity supply for emerging market projects. The focus of this paper is complemen-
tary to the one in Fostel and Geanakoplos [2008]: while their starting point is that
emerging market projects are funded by a small group of "residual" investors, this
paper uses financial distortions to endogenize the fact that emerging market projects
are "residual".
Also related is the literature on volatility, development, and openness. The result
that economies in earlier stages of development become more volatile with financial
integration is in line with Obstfeld [1994], Greenwood and Jovanovic [1990], Acemoglu
and Zilibotti [1997], and Koren and Tenreyro [2009]. The focus in these papers is on
the changes in the sectoral composition induced by better consumption diversification
opportunities. If financial integration allows for better diversification, investors may
be more inclined to take on high-risk projects, potentially increasing the aggregate
riskiness of the economy. This mechanism is very different from the mechanism
discussed in this paper, which does not rely on changes in sectoral composition.
While sectoral composition seems like a plausible source for some shocks, particularly
in lower stages of development, it seems like an unlikely explanation for the heightened
volatility of emerging markets associated with movements in external funds (such as
sudden stops). Moreover, it provides a poor explanation for the common movements
in emerging market economies, which have very different sectoral compositions.
Conceptually related is the work of Caballero et al. [2008], who study global im-
balances as an outcome of financial integration in a world with heterogenous financial
development. While the questions motivating these papers are different, both share
the view that integration with a financially underdeveloped region is an important
factor behind recent trends in the US economy. The work of Fogli and Perri [2006]
links the Great Moderation with global imbalances by arguing that global imbal-
ances are a natural artifact of the decline in volatility. In their model, the decline in
volatility (relative to the rest of the world) reduces households' relative incentives to
accumulate precautionary savings. This paper proposes an alternative link between
financial integration and the Great Moderation. In this model, financial integration
decreases volatility in the developed world and increases volatility in emerging mar-
kets; it could be that as a result, through the mechanism in Fogli and Perri [2006],
the external balance of the developed markets deteriorates. This combined mecha-
nismn demonstrates an additional channel through which finiancial underdevelopment
in emerging markets translates into global imbalances.
The results concerning the endogenous deterioration of the financial system in the
developed world are broadly related to two strands of literature. The idea that low
interest rate environments are conducive to the deterioration of the financial system
shares with the literature on bubbles. As shown in Tirole [1985], environments in
which the interest rate is low are fertile grounds for the formation of bubbles. The
formation of bubbles can be broadly viewed as a form of financial deterioration,
as bubbles can be thought of as "low quality" investments with low fundamental
value. Similar to the model presented here, the presence of bubbles may lead to an
expansion in output (as in Farhi and Tirole [2010] and Martin and Ventura [2010]).
However, the mechanisms through which a low interest rate leads to an expansion
are different: in the bubble literature, bubbles serve as additional sources of liquidity,
which enable more economic activity. In this paper, low interest rates are indicative of
a situation in which the global supply of liquidity is already high; the expansion results
from an endogenous decision of intermediaries to implement projects indiscriminately,
increasing the total amount of projects implemented.
Similar to the literature on bubbles mentioned above, this paper takes the view
that the root of the crisis is a sudden contraction in the supply of liquidity. The con-
traction in the supply of liquidity is not modeled here explicitly, and may be thought
of as resulting from a burst of a bubble on an asset used for liquidity purposes (see
Holmstrom [2008]). However, unlike the bubble-burst view of the crisis, in this model
the burst of the bubble itself does not explain the full extent of the crisis. Rather,
the crisis is amplified by the structural changes that the financial system underwent
during the expansionary period. The emphasis on the role of financial frictions as an
amplification mechanism of the crisis shares with Hall [2009], Gertler and Kiyotaki
[2010], and others. The view closest to this paper is the one expressed in Brunner-
meier [2009] and Gorton [2008]. These papers discuss mechanisms through which a
low interest rate environment led to a decline in lending standards and institutional
changes which evidently amplified the subprime crisis. The model presented in this
paper may be seen as a simple formalization grouping these phenomena.
Methodologically, this paper is related to the literature emphasizing the role of su-
permodularity and log supermodularity conditions in various economic fields. Promi-
nent examples include, among others, Milgrom and Weber [1982] in auction theory;
Bulow et al. [1985] in industrial organization; Jewitt [1987] and Athey [2002] in mono-
tone comparative statics under uncertainty; Shimer and Smith [2000] in matching;
and Costinot [2009] in international trade.
1.3 A Simple Model of Financial Distortions
In this section, I develop a notion of financial distortions, and show some microfoun-
dations consistent with this formulation.
1.3.1 Basic Environment
Consider an economy in which there is a single consumption good, and a single input
of production called working capital, denoted N. Working capital is funds used to hire
workers, rent capital and buy intermediate inputs. Many of the results that follow
will focus on the volatility of output attributed to the volatility of working capital;
thus, working capital should be thought of as a variable affecting output through a
fluctuating supply of funds6 .
The fundamentals of the economy are given by an aggregate productivity level,
A, and a set of projects indexed x E (0, 1). A project requires one unit of working
capital to implement. If implemented, project x produces Ag(x) > 0 units of output,
where, without loss of generality, g is decreasing.
1.3.2 The Financial System
The role of the financial system is to allocate working capital to projects. I restrict
attention to allocation schemes in which projects are implemented according to some
order: the financial system organizes projects on a list. Given a supply of N < 1
units of working capital, the first N elements on the list are to be implemented. Each
unit of working capital may implement fractions of different projects. as long as the
6 From an empirical standpoint, I prefer not to interpret N as physical capital, as physical capital
does not fluctuate substantially at a business cycle frequency.
fractions sum up to 1. Equivalently, the fraction of implemented projects of each type
is assumed to be weakly increasing in the level of working capital.
Formally, a financial system is represented by a function og(N, x), that determines
the density of projects of type x implemented with the Nth unit of working capital.
At this point, the parameter # is simply an index of the financial system; later I will
assume that it corresponds to the level of distortion. The function o must satisfy the
following condition, which guarantees that the total volume of projects implemented
with each unit of working capital is 1, and that each project is fully implemented
when the economy is satiated with working capital:
j o>k(N, x)dx = jog (N, x)dN = 1 (1.1)
The marginal product of working capital is given by:
y(N, #) =] foc u(N, x)Ag(x)dx (1.2)
To see this, note that the above expression is a weighted average of productivities,
where the weight on projects of type x is given by oa(N, x), the density of projects
of type x implemented with the N-th unit of working capital.
Aggregate output is given by the integral of the marginal product of working
capital:
Y(N, #) = y(N', #)dN' (1.3)
I restrict attention to allocation schemes that deliver a decreasing marginal prod-
uct of working capital:
&y(N, #$)
< 0 (1.4)
DN -
I impose a partial ordering on the set of distortions. The notation # > #' indicates
that the allocation scheme governed by # is more distorted than the allocation scheme
governed by #'.
Assumption 1 For all # > #' and N > N':
1> y(N, #) y(N, #') (1.5)
- y(N', #) y(N', #')
The assumption above states that the marginal product of working capital, y(N, #),
is log supermodular in N and #. If In y is differentiable with respect to N, this con-
dition is equivalent to the statement that I0 , is increasing in #. This turns out
to be an important aspect of Assumption 1. In particular, if N is the level of working
capital, Assumption 1 implies that for any small c > 0,
> y(N + e,) y(N + c, (')
- y(N - e, #) y(N - , #')
This inequality states that, around the marginal unit of working capital, the
barely-implemented projects are more similar to the projects that just fall short from
being implemented.
Intuitively, Assumption 1 means that better projects are implemented earlier on
the list in less distorted economies; the decline in the relative quality of implemented
projects is steeper the more efficient the allocation. The intuition is perhaps best
understood when considering a simple economy in which there are only two projects:
a good project which produces 3 if implemented, and a bad project which produces
1 if implemented:
g(good) 3 (1.7)
g(bad) = 1 (1.8)
For whatever reason, the financial system errs with some probability # E [0, ) and
implements the bad project before the good project. The parameter # captures the
level of distortion, as the probability of an error is higher in more distorted economies.
The case 0 corresponds to the efficient case. The case # = 1 corresponds to the
case in which projects are implemented completely at random. In the general case,
the marginal product of working capital is:
y(1, #) (1 -- )g(good) + -g(bad) - 3 - 2# (1.9)
y(2, #) =(1 - )-g(bad) + # - g(good) = 2# + 1I1.0
Assumption 1 is satisfied since the following ratio is increasing in #:
y(2,) 2#+1
y~l,) --2~(1.11)y(1,# 3 -2#
Assumption 1 is satisfied both because the return to the first unit of working
capital is lower in more distorted economies, and because the return to the second
unit of working capital is higher in more distorted economies.
More generally, Assumption 1 draws on the following principle. In efficient economies
only the most highly productive projects are implemented when funds are scarce. As
funds become abundant, the economy runs out of highly productive projects, and
less productive projects are implemented as well. In distorted economies, the order
in which projects are implemented is inefficient. Scarce funds are used to implement
an inferior set of projects; some unproductive projects are implemented, while some
highly productive projects are not. This suggests that the quality of implemented
projects is closer to the quality of unimplemented projects. At the margin, the ex-
pected ratio of the quality of just-implemented projects and just-not-implemented
projects is lower in more distorted economies, reflecting the idea that the implemen-
tation outcome is more affected by factors unrelated to productivity.
Some notes are in order regarding the limitations of this approach. Assuming
that projects are implemented according to some order is somewhat restrictive, as
not all microfoundations of distortions take this form. This restriction rules out
distortions in which some projects are implemented when resources are scarce, but not
implemented when resources are abundant. However, in its reduced form, Assumption
1 will continue to hold as long as an increase in the amount of funding is associated
with an increase in the efficiency of the allocation. This is in the spirit of Kiyotaki and
Moore [1997], and consistent with other models of financial distortions, such as Rajan
[1994]. Intuitively, in these models the returns to the marginal units of funding have
a relatively high return because they increase the productivity of the inframarginal
units of funding.
Even under the restriction that projects are implemented according to some order,
there are alternative ways to rank distortions that do not necessarily imply compliance
with Assumption 1. A particularly appealing way to rank distortions is according to
the productivity loss that they induce: a more distorted economy can be defined
naturally as one in which output is lower for any given level of working capital.
Assumption 1 is more restrictive than compliance with this property. However, there
is some comfort in the fact that Assumption 1 guarantees that there is a productivity
loss induced by higher financial distortions:
Lemma 1 The level of output Y(N, &), is decreasing in the distortion parameter $.
The proof is omitted from the text and, together with other omitted proofs, can
be found in the appendix. The converse of Lemma 1 is not necessarily true: requiring
that a higher distortion parameter induces a productivity loss need not imply compli-
ance with Assumption 1. Intuitively, the added restriction in Assumption 1 is that in
more distorted economies, the implementation outcome depends less on productivity
at any level of working capital. It is possible to construct examples of distortions
in which productivity matters less for the implementation outcome at some levels of
working capital, but matters more at other levels of working capital7 .
While Assumption 1 does not include all possible models of distortions, it points
at a property that is fairly general and common to many microfoundations, as will be
demonstrated in the section that follows. The particular property emphasized by As-
sumption 1 turns out to have far-reaching implications for macroeconomic volatility,
7Consider the following simple example, in which an elite set of projects indexed x E (0, z) is
implemented according to the efficient order, and the rest of the projects are implemented randomly.
Of course, compared to the efficient allocation, there is a productivity loss induced by this distor-
tion. However, Assumption 1 is violated, as at N = T. there is a larger difference in the average
productivities of projects implemented at the margin and projects just-not-implemented.
which may not be true under less restrictive conditions.
1.3.3 Microfoundations
In this section I present three microfoundations of distortions. The first inicrofoun-
dation will be used to illustrate the results throughout the paper.
Asymmetric information (random allocation). Consider a stark model in
which there are two types of economies: efficient and distorted. In efficient economies,
the financial system employs a technology that allows projects to be screened ac-
cording to their type. Projects are implemented in the efficient order. In distorted
economies. the financial system lacks the technology to distinguish between projects.
As project owners receive large private benefits from implementing their projects, the
only equilibrium is a pooling equilibrium in which projects are implemented indis-
criminately. As a result, projects are implemented completely at random: the order
in which projects are implemented is completely unrelated to their productivity.
Formally. in the efficient economy, projects are implemented in an order decreas-
ing in their returns; given any N units of working capital, the first N projects will
be implemented. Output is given by the aggregation of the productivities of all im-
plemented projects:
N
Y(N, efficient) = Ag(x)dx (1.12)
The marginal product of working capital is therefore given by:
y(N, efficient) = Ag(N) (1.13)
Note that, in the efficient allocation, the function o is a Dirac measure, imple-
menting the entire project indexed x with the x-th unit of working capital. The
log of the marginal product of working capital is decreasing, as the productivity of
implemented projects declines with working capital.
In contrast, in the distorted economy, a random set of projects is implemented.
The function o(N, x) is equal to 1 for all x and N, capturing the fact that each unit
of working capital implements a random set of projects. Output is given by:
Y(N, distorted) = N 1 -Ag(x)dx (1.14)
The marginal product of working capital is therefore given by:
y(N, distorted) = j -Ag(x)dx (1.15)
Since the log of the marginal product is decreasing in N in the efficient economy
and constant in the random allocation, the random allocation is more distorted than
the efficient economy in accordance with Assumption 1'.
Collateral constraints. Consider a model in which projects are characterized by
their type, x, and by their collateral type, b. Assume that collateral types (b) are
distributed independently from the project type (x). Conditional on any project type,
collateral is uniformly distributed on [0, cp]. The collateral level of the project is given
by the following decreasing function:
K(b) = g(min{b, 1}) (1.16)
That is, collateral is decreasing in b, and is bounded from below by the productivity
of the least productive project.
A project with features (x, b) is implemented if and only if both its return and its
collateral level exceed the price of working capital:
g(x) > r (1.17)
K(b) > r (1.18)
8 Alternatively, rather than assuming that the random allocation is a result of this form of asym-
metric information, this allocation may result from institutional arrangements under which the in-
centives to implement projects are detached from their returns. This may be the case, for example,
in the presence of corruption or government expropriation.
The mismatch between the quality of projects and their collateral changes the
order in which projects are implemented. Note that a higher # implies that the ag-
gregate collateral is lower. It is easy to see that # -a 0 corresponds to the efficient
allocation, as all projects have sufficient collateral to be implemented when their re-
turn is high enough. The case # -+ oo corresponds to an extremely distorted economy,
in which essentially all projects are collateral constrained and can be implemented
only when the market return is equal to the productivity of the least productive
project; in this case, the marginal product of working capital is close to constant, as
projects are implemented essentially in a random order (as in the previous example).
Lemma 2 Assume that g(x) = ax(1-0). in this model of collateral constraints,
Assumption 1 is satisfied.
Search frictions. Consider a model in which economies differ in the search tech-
nology available to their financial systems. In each economy there are # local banks
indexed i 0, ..., # - 1. Projects owners are unaware of their project's type until
right before production decisions must be made. Local banks are modeled as risk
sharing arrangements among project owners. Each local bank shares risk among
project owners. The bank indexed i is a risk sharing arrangement between the owners
of projects indexed xE (C , i] (for i = -1, the segment of projects is the open set
(00, 1)). The process of distributing funds from households to projects is as follows:
1. Households supply funds to a large savings bank. The savings bank has direct
access to projects (but is unaffiliated with the local banks, and is unaware of
projects' types).
2. The savings bank distributes funds randomly among projects owners.
3. Project owners handover their funds to their local bank. When the productivity
of projects is revealed, the local bank uses the funds in its hands to implement
the best set of projects among those owned by the bank's members.
The parameter # can be thought of as a measure inversely related to the integration
of the domestic financial system. A high # captures a situation in which there are some
banks with access to highly productive projects that lack liquidity to implement them,
and some banks with high liquidity without access to good projects. The case - 1
corresponds to the efficient allocation: there is only one bank in charge of allocating
the entire supply of funds, and the bank has access to the entire set of projects. The
optimal set of projects is therefore implemented. The case # -+ oo corresponds to the
random allocation example: project owners are essentially in autarky, as they must
use their own funds to implement their own project. The implementation of projects
is therefore random, as it does not depend on the level of productivity.
Lemma 3 Assume that g(x) = e . In this model of search frictions, Assumption 1
is satisfied.
1.4 Closed Economy Equilibrium
The characterization of the closed economy equilibrium is useful in two ways. First,
it provides a benchmark for comparison with the open economy. Comparing the
closed economy equilibrium with the open economy equilibrium will be useful for
understanding the implications of financial integration. Second, the closed economy
equilibrium isolates a particular mechanism through which financial distortions am-
plify output volatility, which will be important both in section 1.5 and in section
1.6.
Households inelastically supply Q units of liquidity to the financial system, in
exchange for future returns. In this model, liquidity is defined simply as the supply
side of working capital. The market clearing condition is:
N = Q (1.19)
After production takes place, the financial system repays households at a rate of
r units of output per unit of liquidity. I assume that r is equated with the marginal
product of working capital. This can be thought of as a result of a competitive
banking system in which banks compete for liquidity supply from households.
There are two sources of volatility: shocks to the domestic technology level A,
and shocks to the supply of liquidity, Q. I assume that these shocks are independent.
Appendix 1.10 presents a model of liquidity supply in which this assumption is satis-
fied. In that model, liquidity supply fluctuations are driven by shocks to the money
supply and shocks to investor's risk aversion.
It is straightforward to show that, in the closed economy, the sensitivity of output
to TFP shocks is unrelated to the degree of financial distortions. However, more
distorted economies are more sensitive to shocks to liquidity supply:
Proposition 1 For any given processes of A and Q,
1. Output is more volatile in more distorted economies:
SlnY(Q, #)
&lnQ is increasing in # (1.20)
2. Average productivity is more sensitive to liquidity supply shocks in less distorted
economies:
aY(Q4)
Q is increasing in # (1.21)BlIn Q
Proposition 1 follows from the property of financial distortions emphasized in
Assumption 1. In relatively more efficient economies, the decline in the average pro-
ductivity of projects mitigates the effect of an increase in working capital. In distorted
economies, a suboptimal set of projects is implemented, so some low-yield projects
are implemented before higher-yield projects. This implies two things. First, some
projects that should have been implemented are not implemented; their implemen-
tation takes place only when the supply of working capital is higher, intensifying the
returns to working capital. Second, some projects that should not have been im-
plemented are implemented, lowering the average product of working capital in the
economy. These two facts put together imply that the ratio of the marginal product
of working capital and the average product of working capital is higher in distorted
economies. In other words, liquidity abundance increases the efficiency of distorted
economies relative to efficient economies both by alleviating the inefficiency caused by
Y(N) (N)
Qd Q..
(a) Developed markets (b) Emerging markets
Figure 1-1: The autarkic equilibria
implementing a suboptimal set of projects and by allowing for the implementation of
higher-yield projects. Using the random allocation example, figure 1-1 illustrates the
properties of the closed economy equilibria in a distorted "emerging market" economy
and an efficient "developed market" economy.
1.5 Volatility Divergence
In this section I present a set of results concerning the divergence of volatility between
emerging and developed economies following financial integration. I first present the
globally integrated equilibrium, and then discuss equilibrium implications for small
open economies.
The setup of the model is as follows. There are two regions of equal size: an
emerging market region (em) and a developed market region (d). For the time being,
I assume that the only difference between emerging and developed economies is that
emerging economies are more distorted than developed economies:
#em > kd (1.22)
I assume that var(ln(Ad)) = var(ln(Aem)) 9 and that liquidity supply Qj is inde-
pendent from both foreign and domestic technology, Ai and AJ.
In order to isolate the effects of financial heterogeneity on the global equilibrium
environment, it is convenient to assume that Qd and Qem are perfectly correlated.
Assuming that liquidity supplies are perfectly correlated isolates the effects of finan-
cial heterogeneity because, under this assumption, financial integration between two
identical economies would have no effect on liquidity-supply driven output volatil-
ity. In contrast, independent liquidity supplies would imply that financial integration
between two identical regions has a moderating effect on output in both regions as
shocks to liquidity supply are shared across regions. Replacing the assumption that
Qd and Qen are perfectly correlated with the assumption that they are independent
would therefore decrease volatility in both regions; however, the result that volatility
induced by financial integration would be relatively higher for emerging economies
would still hold.
1.5.1 Integrated Equilibrium
Assume that liquidity can move freely across regions. The global equilibrium is char-
acterized by two equations:
Nem +Nd = Qem + Qd - Qw (1.23)
yem(Nem, #em) = yd(Nd, #d) = r (1.24)
The first equation is a market clearing condition, stating that the total amount
of working capital, Nem + Nd, must be equal the global supply of liquidity, Qw =
Qem + Qd. The second condition is the optimality condition of the financial system,
requiring that there is no gain from reallocating liquidity from one region to another.
I denote autarkic values with superscript a (Na, Ya, etc). Denote by A the
absolute value of the average change in working capital levels induced by financial
9 The results trivially generalize to var(ln(Ad)) < var(ln(Aem)).
integration:
A =E(Nem) - E(Nem)= IE(Nd) - E(N") (1.25)
The value of A is determined in equilibrium as a function of the average supply of
liquidity, the financial distortions, and the relative productivities A. In particular,
there is always a value of Ad for which A = 0. For the purpose of this exercise, I
assume that A is small. The importance of this assumption is in assuring that the
sensitivity of output to working capital remains similar to its autarkic level. If this
assumption is violated, the implications of financial integration on macroeconomic
volatility depend more specifically on how the sensitivity of output with respect to
working capital changes with the level of working capital.
The main result is stated in the proposition below:
Proposition 2 For A sufficiently small, financial integration exacerbates the volatil-
ity differences between emerging and developed markets:
var(ln Nem) - var(ln Nd) > var(ln N,m) - var(ln Nd") = 0 (1.26)
var(ln Yem) - var(ln Yd) > var(ln Ye m) - var(ln Yda) > 0 (1.27)
10
Financial integration leads to a divergence in volatility levels for two reasons
First, financial integration is associated with a new source of fluctuations in work-
ing capital, which is shocks to the relative productivity of emerging and developed
economies (A-). These shocks lead to a substitution of working capital across re-
gions. Since, by proposition 1, financially-distorted emerging markets are more sen-
sitive to fluctuations in working capital than developed markets, this works towards
exacerbating the differences in output volatility across regions.
Second, it turns out that shocks to the global supply of liquidity adjust dispro-
portionately through changes in the supply of working capital to emerging markets.
10 Proposition 2 easily generalizes to an equilibrium with many countries with different levels of
distortions. In an integrated equilibrium, the sensitivity of each economy to shocks to the global
supply of liquidity or to TFP will be an increasing function of its level of financial distortions.
Differences in volatility levels will magnify upon financial integration.
This equilibrium property is closely related to the feature of financial distortions em-
phasized by Assumption 1, and particulary to its interpretation in equation 1.6. In
developed markets, projects are implemented in an order decreasing in their returns:
most implemented projects generate returns which well exceed r, and most of the
unimplemented projects generate returns which are well below r. Fluctuations in the
implementation threshold therefore have a relatively small impact on the amount of
projects implemented in developed economies. In contrast, in emerging markets, the
order in which projects are implemented is more arbitrary; this implies that the return
generated by the next unit of working capital is similar to the return generated by
the previous unit. The same fluctuations in r therefore induce larger fluctuations in
the amount of implemented projects. Figure 1-2 illustrates this equilibrium property
in the random allocation example".
Generically, abstracting from productivity shocks, financial integration leads to
less variation in r from the developed market's perspective, and more variation in
r from the emerging market's perspective. Consequently, there is a divergence in
liquidity-driven output volatility between emerging and developed economies.
The direction in which volatility levels change following financial integration is po-
tentially different in emerging and developed economies. In emerging economies, the
volatility of working capital necessarily increases upon integration. This is because
working capital becomes vulnerable to two new shocks: shocks to foreign liquidity
supply (Qd) and shocks to relative technology levels (A-r). In developed economies,
working capital also becomes vulnerable to shocks to relative technology, which works
towards increasing volatility. However, working capital becomes less sensitive to
shocks to domestic liquidity supply (Qd), since shocks to liquidity supply adjust pri-
marily through movements in the working capital supplied to emerging markets. The
net effect on volatility depends on the relative importance of technology shocks and
liquidity shocks. Specifically, if movements in the level of working capital result pri-
marily from variation in the supply of liquidity, financial integration will decrease the
"In the random allocation example, the equilibrium level of r does not change following a shock
to global liquidity supply. Rather, the shock is adjusted entirely through changes in the quantity of
working capital supplied to the emerging market region.
Yd(N) Ye.(N)
r
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Figure 1-2: The integrated equilibrium
volatility of output in developed economies.
Under stronger assumptions regarding the relative importance of liquidity and
technology shocks, it is possible to obtain stronger results concerning the direction in
which volatility levels change following financial integration:
Proposition 3 For A sufficiently small,
1. Financial integration increases the volatility of working capital and the volatility
of output in emerging markets:
var(lnNem) > var(lnNm) (1.28)
var(lnYem) > var(lnYam) (1.29)
2. If the variance of liquidity supply is sufficiently large compared to the variance
of relative TFP, financial integration decreases the volatility of working capital
and the volatility of output in developed markets:
var(ln Nd) < var(ln Nd") (1.30)
var(In Yd) < var(lnY) (1.
These results provide some insight into the distinct behavior of emerging and
developed markets following globalization. The theory above suggests that the di-
vergence in liquidity-driven output fluctuations may have been a result of developed
markets effectively exporting their liquidity shocks to emerging markets.
1.5.2 Small Open Economies
Given that much of the literature on the excess volatility of emerging markets has
focused on small open economies, it is useful to study small open economies in the
context of this global equilibrium environment.
I assume that each region is composed of a continuum of small open economies,
identical within regions. Small open economies are subject to idiosyncratic produc-
tivity shocks, as well as to exogenous shocks to r which result from changes in the
global liquidity supply.
The first thing to note is that this model naturally implies comovements in emnerg-
ing market economies. Compared to their developed counterparts, small open emerg-
ing markets are more severely affected by shocks to the global liquidity supply. The
importance of global liquidity supply as a source of emerging market fluctuations
naturally implies common movements in emerging market output levels. Similar to
Fostel and Geanakoplos [2008], comovements in emerging market economies result
from a common sensitivity to an external supply of funding.
Second, it is interesting to note that both in emerging and in developed markets,
working capital responds similarly to idiosyncratic productivity shocks and to shocks
to the price of liquidity. This suggests a link between the heightened sensitivity of
emerging markets to interest rate shocks (as in Neumeyer and Perri [2005] and Uribe
and Yue [2006]) and the amplification of shocks to productivity (as in Caballero et al.
[2005]). To see this link, note that in a small open economy, the level of working capital
is pinned down by a single indifference condition, equating the marginal product of
.31)
working capital with the world rate of return:
y(N, #) = og (N, x)Ag(x)dx = r > J o(N, x)g(x)dx = (1.32)
From the formulation above, it is easy to see that working capital is affected
similarly by shocks to r and shocks to A. Essentially, in this model, the responsiveness
of working capital to either type of shock captures the density of projects which
are implemented at the margin and collectively yield a return equal exactly to r.
A small shock to the returns of these projects will shift them above or below the
implementation threshold; similarly, small shocks to r will determine whether or
not the projects at the margin generate a return which justifies implementation. The
result that small open emerging markets are relatively more sensitive to both shocks is
closely tied to Assumption 1, as it guarantees that the density of projects implemented
at the margin is higher.
The model presented in this section suggests the following conclusions regarding
the role of financial institutions in determining the effects of financial integration on
output volatility. Poor financial institutions in emerging markets exacerbate their
sensitivity to working capital, as well as increase the volatility of working capital
supplied to that region. At times in which financial institutions are intact in developed
markets, their superior ability to implement projects differentially serves both to
stabilize equilibrium working capital levels and to mitigate the effects of fluctuations
in working capital on output.
1.6 The Endogenous Deterioration of the Finan-
cial System
In section 1.5 it was assumed throughout that the quality of financial institutions
remains fixed upon financial integration. While this may be a valid short-run as-
sumption, the recent subprime crisis comes as a reminder that the quality of financial
institutions may evolve with changing circumstances.
In section 1.6.1 I consider a model in which the financial system in the developed
world deteriorates endogenously following financial integration. In section 1.6.2 I
discuss the implications of the deterioration during "normal times". I show that
in the absence of large shocks, the deterioration of the financial system actually
increases and stabilizes output in the developed world. In section 1.6.3 I show that
the deterioration in the financial system amplifies large adverse shocks.
1.6.1 Endogenous Deterioration
I extend the setup to allow for an endogenous adjustment in the quality of the financial
system in the developed world. Banks can choose the level of financial distortions
out of some finite set. There is a cost A(O) associated with choosing the level of
distortions #, where A(.) is decreasing. This cost should be thought of as the cost
of sorting projects and overcoming other obstacles which stand in the way of an
efficient allocation. For simplicity, I assume that banks consider only the mean price
of liquidity when choosing the level of financial distortions, and do not take into
account any uncertainty.
Given a price of liquidity r, the banks choose the level of working capital, Nd, and
the level of distortion, Od, to maximize profits. The bank's profits are given by:
-r(r) = max{7r(r, Nd, #d) = (1.33)
Od,Nd
,Nd
max y(N', #Od)dN' - rNd - A(#d) (1.34)
Note that for A-d sufficiently large, financial integration will be associated with aAem
decline in r from the developed market's perspective.
Proposition 4 For Q sufficiently large, a decline in r will lead to an endogenous
deterioration of the financial system.
It is straightforward to show that the objective of banks in this model coincides
with the objective of a social planner trying to maximize domestic output minus the
costs of differentiation (under assumption that the cost of liquidity is given by r).
The deterioration in the financial system can therefore be interpreted more broadly
as an outcome of endogenous lax regulation.
In the context of the recent crisis, the above proposition formalizes the popu-
lar claim according to which financial integration increased the equilibrium level of
financial distortions by lowering the price of liquidity from the developed market's
perspective1 2 . Intuitively, if liquidity is sufficiently cheap so that nearly all projects
are implemented anyway, the benefits of differentiating between projects may not be
worth the cost". Broadly interpreted, the financial system will gravitate towards var-
ious institutional arrangements that tie the implementation of high quality projects
with the implementation of low quality projects.
1.6.2 Normal Fluctuations
What are the implications of the deterioration of the financial system on output and
on output volatility? Under autarky, the implications would be fairly intuitive: a
weakening of the financial system would decrease output and increase subsequent
output volatility 4 . However, these intuitive results breakdown under financial inte-
gration. The following proposition states that the deterioration in the quality of the
financial system in the developed world will increase working capital in that region,
"A note is in order regarding the applicability of these results to emerging market economies.
The analysis in this section relies heavily on the assumption that financial integration is associated
with a decline in the price of liquidity from the domestic perspective. The results are therefore
not applicable for emerging markets. For emerging markets, the mirror image is the relevant one:
financial integration is associated with an increase in r, potentially leading to an endogenous increase
the the quality of financial institutions. The characterization of the long run general equilibrium
environment, in which financial institutions are allowed to adjust in both emerging and developed
economies, is beyond the scope of this paper. I leave this interesting issue for future research.
1 3 1t is worth noting that, in general, the relationship between r and the equilibrium choice of
financial distortions is non-monotonic. At sufficiently low levels of r, a decrease in r will decrease
the benefits of investing in high-quality financial institutions. However, it is easy to show that, at
high levels of r, a small drop in the price of liquidity will have the opposite effect. This is because
there is a scale effect: the investment in the ability to differentiate is only worthwhile if production
is sufficiently high.
1 4 To see this, note that by Lemma 1, holding working capital fixed, output is higher when financial
institutions are intact (because a superior set of projects are implemented). Thus, a weakening of the
financial system constitutes an adverse shock to output. The fact that subsequent output volatility
increases is immediate from the comparison between closed emerging and developed economies in
section 3.4.
and may increase and stabilize output as well:
Proposition 5 In a financially integrated equilibrium:
1. An endogenous weakening of the financial system in the developed market will
increase working capital in that region.
2. For Q,, and A sufficiently large, a weakening of the financial system in the
developed world will increase and stabilize output.
d(N) Y.(N)
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Figure 1-3: The endogenous deterioration of the financial system
Proposition 5 builds on a comparative static result that shows that an endoge-
nous deterioration of the financial system is possible in equilibrium only if it increases
the marginal product of working capital. The weakening of financial institutions is
therefore associated with an additional flow of working capital towards developed
economies. If this flow is sufficiently large, domestic output will rise. To under-
stand why volatility declines, note that the distortion ties the implementation of
high-quality projects to the implementation of low-quality projects. Thus, many
"marginal" projects become inframarginal, as their discontinuation would necessitate
the discontinuation of some high-quality projects.
Proposition 5 can shed light on the seemingly "irrational" behavior that led up to
the subprime crisis, in which many bad loans were given to subprime borrowers, and,
while the financial system behaved "irresponsibly", the demand for US assets seemed
only to increase.
Finally, does the fact that output in the developed world increases with the de-
terioration of its financial system mean that such a deterioration is "good"? From a
global perspective, no. The generic adverse effect of a deterioration in the financial
system is that it decreases world output, both under autarky and under financial
integration:
Lemma 4 A weakening of the financial system in the developed world decreases world
output.
This lemma is immediate from the fact that intact financial institutions allow for
a differential implementation of projects based on their returns; the set of projects
implemented when differentiation is not possible is necessarily inferior to the set of
projects implemented when some differentiation is possible.
1.6.3 Large Adverse Shocks
In the global environment described in this paper, the deterioration of the financial
system in the developed world serves to increase and stabilize output in that region
during normal times. However, while the response to small shocks is mitigated, the
output response to large negative shocks is amplified:
Proposition 6 In the developed world, the weakening of the financial system ampli-
fies the output response to large adverse shocks to Q, or AdAem'
Intuitively, cheap liquidity leads to structural changes in the financial system that
disable the separation of high-quality projects from low-quality projects. During
normal times, this increases the amount of low-quality projects being implemented,
and output increases as a result. However, sufficiently large contractions in liquidity
are amplified by the inability to separate the discontinuation of low-quality projects
from the discontinuation of high-quality projects.
This result suggests that the deterioration in the quality of financial institutions
preceding the sub-prime crisis may have indeed precipitated it by creating an ampli-
fication mechanism for large adverse shocks. This amplification mechanism is consis-
tent with many inefficiencies that seem important for understanding the extent of the
crisis. A straightforward interpretation is the mortgage market itself. The creation of
mortgage backed securities enabled the pooling of idiosyncratic risk of subprime loans.
Once housing prices declined, issuing new subprime loans became difficult, perhaps
in part because the process of issuing subprime loans did not allow for differentia-
tion between relatively promising borrowers and relatively unpromising borrowers. A
more subtle interpretation is the balance sheet effect (as in Brunnermeier [2009]). The
heavy reliance of banks' balance sheets on mortgage backed securities forced them to
disengage from productive lending activities once the subprime crisis hit. This can
be viewed as an additional mechanism that ties the implementation of productive
projects to the implementation of unproductive projects.
Corollary 1 Financial integration may lead to the amplification of large adverse
shocks in the developed world.
Corollary 12 is immediate from the analysis in this section: by Proposition 4,
financial integration leads to the deterioration of the financial system. By Proposition
6. the deterioration in the financial system amplifies the output response to large
adverse shocks.
Note that this analysis also suggests that the subprime crisis cannot be explained
solely in terms of a breakdown in the financial system; rather, a complete explanation
would require either an additional large shock to TFP or to liquidity supply.
The results in this section present a modification to the view presented in sec-
tion 1.5 according to which financial integration mitigates output fluctuations in the
developed world. If financial integration with a distorted emerging market region
is coupled with a decline in the price of liquidity (as suggested by Caballero et al.
[2008]), the quality of financial institutions may adjust downwards in accordance with
Proposition 4. As a result, the sensitivity of output with respect to small shocks will
decrease, but large adverse shocks will be amplified.
1.7 Conclusion
This paper studies the effects of financial distortions on the global equilibrium envi-
ronment. I present a reduced form formulation of financial distortions according to
which the marginal product of working capital is log supermodular in working capital
and the level of distortion. This formulation is consistent with a class of microfoun-
dations in which the distortion changes the order in which projects are implemented,
in a way which results in an order of implementation which is less indicative of the
relative quality of projects.
Upon financial integration, financial distortions affect global volatility patterns
through two related channels: first, financial distortions determine the sensitivity of
output to liquidity supply. Output in emerging markets is more sensitive to liquidity
supply, because the projects implemented at the margin have high returns compared
to the projects implemented infra-marginally. Second, in the integrated economy, the
higher level of distortion in emerging markets causes them to absorb a larger fraction
of the volatility of global liquidity supply. As a result, financial integration increases
liquidity-driven output volatility in emerging markets, and decreases liquidity-driven
output volatility in developed markets.
In the long run, a global environment in which liquidity is cheap is conducive
to a deterioration in the financial system in the developed world. In the integrated
economy, a deterioration in the quality of the financial system has a mixed effect
on output in developed economies: in the absence of large liquidity or TFP shocks,
it serves to increase output and to reduce output volatility. However, the response
of output to large adverse liquidity shocks is amplified. This offers a modified view
regarding the long run effect of financial integration on developed market output
volatility. As the quality of financial institutions adjusts downward, the economy
becomes less sensitive to normal fluctuations, but more adversely affected by large
shocks.
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1.8 Appendix A: Figures
The diverging trends of output volatility in emerging and developed markets. The
series are taken from the World Economic Outlook, April, 2009. The series labeled
"Emerging markets" corresponds to the series "Emerging and developing economies",
and the series labeled "Developed economies" corresponds to the series "Advanced
economies".
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1.9 Appendix B: Proofs
1.9.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Let # > #' and consider the function:
Y(N, #') - Y(N, #) (1.35)
Recall that this function is 0 for N = 0 and for N = 1. Taking a first order condition
yields:
y(N, #') - y(N, #) = 0 (1.36)
This point is a local maximum, as the second derivative is negative by Assumption
1. To see this, using equation 1.36:
Oy(N#') _ dy(Nb)
aN aN
y(Nj/0)
By(N9')
y(N, #')
Uy(N,q)
y(N, b)
a n y(N, #')
ON
& ln y(N, #) < 0
BN
The inequality stems from Assumption 1.
Thus, the function reaches a maximum at the point y(N, #') = y(N, #). The
minima or this function are therefore at N = 0 and N = 1, at which the function
takes the value of 0. It follows that the function is always weakly greater than 0:
(1.38)
Which concludes the proof.
1.9.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Begin by considering the case # < 1. First, note that for every N, there is a threshold
N such that project (x, b) is implemented if and only if x < N and b < N. For N < #,
N=-Fr b N) - N = 92 _ = N
(1.37)
Y(N, #') - Y (N, #) ;> 0
N = Pr(x < AT, b < R ) (1.39)
Note that N < # if and only if N < #. For N > #, it is easy to see that N = N.
For N < #, output is given by the following expression:
Y(N) =j1 Pr(b < N )Ag(x)dx - -N
It follows that, for N < #:
Y(N, #) = A# N (1.41)
The derivative of Y with respect to N is therefore given by:
I1+c a U1 01y(N,#) 2 A# 2N 2 (1.42)
-> In y(N, #) = ln(1+ a A)- 1 a n#- 1 a n N (1.43)2 2 2
The derivative of above with respect to N is:
Bln y(N,#) 1 - a(
ON 2N (1.44
The above does not depend on # as long as N < #; the log supermodularity
condition is trivially satisfied. However, Note that for a higher #, there are more
values of N such that N < #. Let there be # and #' such that #' < N < #. For #', it
is easy to see that the derivative of ln y(N, #') is given by the following expression:
y(N, 0') - 24aN-' = a ln y(N, #') = ln(Aa) - (1 - a) ln N
On y(N, # N - - O Bln y(N,
O N N 2N 8N
(1.45)
(1.46)
Thus, the derivative of ln y with respect to N is higher in the more distorted
economy #, in accordance with Assumption 1.
Consider now the range # > 1. In this range, for N < 1, N is given by equation
1.39, output is given by equation 1.40 and 9 lY is given by equation 1.44. In thisaN
Ag(x)dx - A l+ (1.40)
range, 0 9 is constant with respect to #, so the log supermodular condition is trivially
satisfied.
Note that N < 1 if and only if vq#N < 1, or N < I. This condition is violated
for more values of N if # is larger. For N > , the marginal product of working
capital is constant; the collateral constraint is binding for all implemented projects,
so the productivity of the projects implemented with each unit of working capital is
the same. Thus, in the range N > j,
lny=(N 0) 0 > (1.47)
aN 2N
The right hand side is equal to the derivative of ln y for the case N < . It follows
that the log supermodularity condition is satisfied for j < N < .
1.9.3 Proof of Lemma 3
Output is given by the following expression:
Y(N, #) = L Ag(x)dx (1.48)
i=O 3
This is because each local bank has units of liquidity to allocate, and uses it to
implement the first N in the sample of projects available to it.
The marginal product of working capital is given by:
y(N,#) =Ag( + -) = e(1.49)
0i=O 0 =
Ae--V
0 i=0
It follows that:
Iny(N,#) = ln( e )+ n N (1.51)
i=O
The derivative of above with respect to N is -~which is increasing in ~.The log
supermodularity condition is satisfied, in accordance with Assumption 1.
1.9.4 Proof of Proposition 1
To show that Y(N, #) is log supermodular, write Y(N, #) as:
Y(N,#) =j (1.52)
Where 1[oN] denotes the indicator function which takes a value 1 over the interval
[0, N] (and 0 elsewhere).
Recall the definition of log supermodularity as it appears in Costinot [2009], which
allows for 0 values:
Definition 1 For X C R', a function h : X -+ IR+ is log supermodular if for all
z. z' E X,
(1.53)
Claim 1 The function h(N, n, ) = 1[0,N](n) is log supermodular in N, n, and #.
To see this, note that both sides of the inequality in 1.53 can be either 0 or 1, and
consider the case in which the left hand side of the inequality is 0:
h(max(N, N'), max(n, n'), max(#, d'))h(min(N, N'), min(n, n'), min(#, #')) = 0
(1.54)
1 [0,max(N,N')] (max(n, n')) 1 [O,min(N,N')] (min(n, n')) = 0 (1.55)
Assume without loss of generality that max(n, n') n. From the above equality,
1[0,max(N,N')] (max(n, n')) = 0 or 1{0,min(N,N')] (min(n, n')) = 0. Assume 1[O,max(N,N')] (max(n, n'))
0. Thus,
n > max(N, N') > n > N #= 1[0,N](n) = 0 #* 1[0,N] (n) [0,N'](n') = 0
1 [0,N] (n) y(n, #) dn
h(max(zij, z'), ... max(zm, --'m))h.(min(zi, z'), ... min(-m, z' )) ;> h,(z)h(z')
(1.56)
Assume instead that 1[0,min(N,N')}(min(x, x')) = 0. There are two cases: if min(N, N')
N',
i' > N' 1[,N'] (n') 0 t 1[0,N] (7) 1[0,N'] 0 (1-57)
if, instead, min(N, N') N, since max(n, n') = n,
n' > N 4 n > N * 1[o,N] (n) = 0 # 1[0,N](n)1[O,N'}(n') = 0 (1.58)
Thus, log supermodularity is satisfied.
The assumption that y(n, #) is log supermodular in (n, #) implies trivially that it
is log supermodular as a function of (N, n, #).
Since the product of two log supermodular functions is log supermodular, and the
integral of a log supermodular function is log supermodular1 5 , it follows that Y(N, #)
is log supermodular. Thus, by log supermodularity, I Y(N,#) is increasing in
The second part of the proposition builds on the first part:
Y(N, # = Y(N, #)N 1  (1.59)
N
Since Y(N, #) is log supermodular, and N 1 is trivially log supermodular, it fol-
lows that average productivity is log supermodular as a product of two log super-
Bln( Y(N,th)
modular functions. Thus, by log supermodularity, aNN isncrasing in b. Since
the derivative is negative, this implies that the sensitivity of average productivity to
the level of working capital is higher in less distorted economies.
1.9.5 Proof of Propositions 2 and 3
1. To show that financial integration exacerbates volatility differences. I begin
by showing that (at autarkic working capital levels) working capital is more
sensitive to the price of liquidity in emerging markets. Since output is more
sensitive to working capital (Proposition 1), and since, by assumption, mean
15For proof see Karlin and Rinott [1980].
levels of working capital remain unchanged following financial integration, the
proposition follows. Since it is assumed that f is decreasing, the working capital
level is such that the marginal product of working capital is equal to its market
price r:
y(N, #) = r (1.60)
It follows that the derivative of N with respect to r is:
DN 1 1
a r - By(N,k) (1.61)
ON ON
Denote:
f (N, #) = fo Uo(N, x) g(x) dx (1.62)
Note that y(N, #; A) = Af(N, 0). The assumption that y is log supermodular
implies trivially that f is log supermodular.
Log supermodularity implies that:
Aemfi(N, dem) 
_ fi (N, #em) fi (N, d) _ Adfi (N, Od) (1.63)
Aemf(N,#em) f(N,# em) f(N,# d) Adf(N,# d)
Since, by assumption, Aemf (N, 4em) Adf(N, #a), it follows that
Aemfi(N, #em) > Ajfi(N, #d) (1.64)
It follows that:
&Na 1 1 &Nem
> (1.65)
ar Adfl(N, #d) Aemfi(N, #em) 
-Br
Since the response of N to r is negative, it follows that Nem is more sensitive to
changes in r. By construction, Nem and Nd are similarly affected by shocks to
relative productivity (which cause a substitution between Nd and Nem). Thus,
since these are the only two sources of variation in N, under the assumption
that Qj = Nf are identically distributed,
var(lnNem) - var(ln Nd) > var(lnNem) - var(nN") =0 (1.66)
To see that financial integration exacerbates the difference in output volatility,
note that:
Bln Y
var(ln Y) = 8n N var(ln N) + var(ln A) (1.67)
Decompose volatility in N into volatility conditional on Q shocks and volatility
conditional on relative TFP shocks:
var(ln N) = var(In NIQ) + var(ln NIA) (1.68)
var(In Ym) - var(ln Yd) - (var(ln Aem) - var(In Ad)) =
n In (var(ln NemIQ) +var(in Nem A)) - In N (var(ln Nd|Q)+
i In Y NmA
= 8 va(In Nem| IA) DIn Yda In N var(ln NdIA)+
(1.69)
var(In Nd|A))
(1.70)
(1.71)
D in Yem
var(lnNIQ)( 0nY Din YdSinN (1.72)
Since the last term is positive, the above is greater than the first tern in the
above expression:
0 In Y, 89 In Y
> In N" (n NeIA) - ln N "ar(ln NdlA)
The following lemma will be useful to conclude the proof:
(1.73)
(a) var(InNem|A) > var(InNa .")
(b) var (In Nd|A) < var(In Na )
Lemma 5
Proof: To see this, consider a benchmark in which economy i integrates with
an economy with an identical sensitivity to r shocks. In this hypothet-
ical case, shocks to domestic and foreign liquidity supply adjust equally
between the two countries. Using the assumption that Qi are perfectly
correlated, it follows that:
1 1
var(Ni) = var( (QI + Q)) = (var(2Qi)) = var(Qi) = var(Na) (1.74)2 4
The lemma above is proved using comparative statics with this benchmark.
Since shocks to liquidity supply have a greater effect on emerging markets,
the volatility of var(Nem) is greater than this benchmark, and since shocks
to liquidity supply have a smaller effect on developed markets, the volatility
of var(Nd) is lower than this benchmark. As mean liquidity levels stay the
same, the lemma (as stated in logs) immediately follows.
Using the above lemma, the expression in equation 1.73 is greater than the
expression below, in which var(ln NilA) are replaced with autarkic values:
8 In Yem a lnYd (1.75)(1.73) > ln N var(ln Nm) - nN ar(ln N")
= var(ln Ya) - var(ln Ya) - (var(In Aem) - var(ln Ad)) (1.76)
- var(In Y) - var(ln Yd) > var(ln Yam) - var(In Ya) (1.77)
Which concludes the proof.
2. (a) To see that financial integration increases volatility of working capital in
the emerging market region, note that both var(Nem|A) > var(Nem A) =
0, and var(NemIQ) > var(NeamIQ). To see that financial integration in-
creases the volatility of output in the emerging market region, note that
since var(A) remains the same, and since the level N is unchanged, from
equation 1.67 output volatility increases as well.
(b) The effect of financial integration on var(Nd) is ambiguous: the volatil-
ity of Nd conditional on holding technology levels constant is smaller, so
var(NdlA) < var(NgjA). However, through the standard RBC channel,
var(N|Q) > var(Nd|Q) = 0. If shocks to relative TFP are sufficiently
small, the first effect dominates so var(Nd) < var(Nd). In this case, from
equation 1.67 (and the assumption that the mean level of N is unchanged),
it follows that output volatility decreases as well.
1.9.6 Proof of Proposition 4
Lemma 6 Consider the problem:
max y(N', #)dN' - A (#) (1.78)
The solution #* is increasing in N for some range N e (N, 1].
Using the proof of Lemma 1, for each pair #3 > #j there is a point 0 < Nij < 1 such
that Y(N, #) has increasing differences for N > Nij and # E {#0, #j}. Let N denote
the maximum of these Nij. In the region (N, 1], there are increasing differences for
all # within the set of possible values. By Sundaram (1996), #* is increasing in N on
that region.
Note that, for any r, #* is the solution to:
max jN y(N', #)dN' - A(#) - rN (1.79)
0 o
This is because rN is a constant in this problem.
Now, assume that Q E (N, 1]. In this range, a drop in r is associated with an
increase in N*. It follows that #* increases.
1.9.7 Proof of Proposition 5
For what follows, denote by #' the level of distortions in the deteriorated "weak"
financial system, and by #' the autarkic "intact" level of financial distortions. Nor-
malize A(#)= 0 and A(#') = A.
I begin with the first part of the proposition. By equations 1.36 and 1.37, there
is a unique point No E (0., 1) such that:
yd(NO, #i) = yd(No, #w) (1.80)
For every N < No, y(N, #') > y(N, #g-0) and for every N > No, y(N, #') < y(N, #w).
Recall that in this setup, prior to financial integration the financial system in the
developed world was endogenously intact, and it endogenously deteriorated following
a drop in r. It turns out that these dynamics are possible only if r is such that
working capital levels exceed No (when the financial system is intact and the economy
is integrated):
Lemma 7 There is an endogenous weakening of the financial system (in the devel-
oped world) only if r < y(No,#0) = y(No,# o).
Here, r denotes the rate of return on working capital when the financial system
in the developed world is intact.
Proof: Assume r > y(No, #'), and it will be shown that in this case there is no
endogenous financial deterioration. Denote by ra the return to working capital
under autarky in the developed world. We know that given ra, the optimal
choice of financial quality is #d = #i:
7r (r", #i) > 7r (ra, #w) (.1
N N
4 max y(N',#)dN' - raN - A > max y(N', #w)dN' - raN (1.82)
N s o c N O N
The standard optimality condition is y(N, #d) = r" . Denote this N by N* (r,#d).
Thus, the inequality in equation 1.82 can be rewritten as:
(y(N*(r', # #b) - y(N*(,r, # )dr' > A/ood d (1.83)
From the assumption that r > y(No, #'), it follows that Ta > y(No, #d), because
ra > r (there is a drop in r upon financial integration). For r > y(No, #$), it is
also the case that:
(1.84)
This is because, since N*(r, #') < No,
(1.85)
Thus, since y is decreasing in N, the inequality in equation 1.84 holds true.
Note that equation 1.85 holds for any y(No, #d) < r < ra. Thus,
I/N*(r,#) N*(r,4O)y (N', #WdN - rN* (r, #') -- y(N', #w)dN' - r
y(N*(r', # 1), #1)dr' - y(N*(?r', #'), #w)dr'
(y(), #) - y(N*(r', #'), #w))dr'+
/ (y(N*(r', #'), #') - y(N*(r', #w), #w))dr'
N*(r, #w)
(1.86)
(1.87)
(1.88)
(1.89)
By equation 1.83, the first term is greater than A. The second term is positive by
equation 1.85. Thus, the sum above is greater than A. It follows that choosing
#d = # is still preferable to choosing #d = #w. I conclude that an endogenous
financial deterioration is not possible if r- > y(No, #').
To conclude the proof, note that for r < y(No, #),
(1.90)
N*r#) > N*(,#)
y(N* (r, #'), #') < y(N* (r, #'), #')
N*r,#) < N*r #w)
Thus, the deterioration in the quality of the financial system is associated with
an increase in N.
To see the second part of the proposition, note that for Ad sufficiently large,Aem
Yd (1, #dw) > yemn(1, Oemn) (1.91)
From continuity, there exists c > 0 such that for every 1 - 6 < N < 1,
Yd (1, Od) > yem (N, #emr) (1.92)
It follows that for Q,3 > 2 - c, the developed market will be satiated with working
capital. Output is weakly higher than in the intact case (note that the conditions
under which the weakened financial system is satiated with working capital are weaker
than the conditions under which the intact economy is satiated with working capital,
because, since No < 1, yd(l, #') > yd(1, #i)). Under satiation, the developed economy
is stable with respect to small shocks to the global supply of working capital, as the
economy remains satiated as long as Qw satisfies:
yd(1, dW) > yem(Qw ~ 1, em) (1.93)
Similarly, the level of working capital is unaffected by shocks to relative TFP. The
volatility of output is therefore smaller both with respect to liquidity supply shocks
and with respect to shocks to relative TFP.
1.9.8 Proof of Lemma 4
Recall the notation from the proof of Proposition 5: #' denotes the level of distortions
in the deteriorated "weak" financial system, and #' denotes the autarkic "intact" level
of financial distortions.
Given #d, world output maximization solves:
Y(#d) -max Yw(#d, Nd, Nem)= (1.94)
Nd,Nem
NemNaj
max Ad
Nd,New 0
y(N', $d)dN'+ Aem j0
y(N',#em)dN'
Nd+ Nem = Qw (1.96)
(1.97)Ni < 1
Under autarky there is an additional constraint which is:
(1.98)
It is easy to see that for any given couple (Nd, Nem) which satisfy constraints 1.96-
1.97 or 1.96-1.98, the output produced is higher when the financial system in the
developed market is intact:
Yw (#d, Nd, Nem) Yw(, Nd, Nem) (1.99)
Denote by (N*(#bd), Ne*m(0d)) the optimal allocation of working capital given #d. From
the optimality of N/(#i):
(1.100)
And, from equation 1.99:
Yw (#d N , N d (Ow)) = Yw (#w) (1.101)
It follows that world output is higher when the financial system in the developed
market is intact:
(1.102)
(1.95)
-:> YW (# 3) ;> YW (#d)
YW(01) = YW(O 71 N d N* (Ow), N,*. (Ow))d * (0" ), Ne*m (0" )) > Yw (0"d d d - d d d d
1.9.9 Proof of Proposition 6
Recall the notation from the proof of Proposition 5: #' denotes the level of distortions
in the deteriorated "weak" financial system, and #5d denotes the autarkic "intact" level
of financial distortions.
Let No be given by the condition in equation 1.36:
y(No, #') = y(No, #') (1.103)
Consider a shock to the global supply of liquidity such that Q. < No. In this
range, the marginal product of working capital in the developed world is higher under
intact financial institutions. It follows that working capital is higher:
(1.104)
Since output decreases with the level of distortion by Lemma 1,
Y(N*(Qw, #i), #i) > Y(N(Qw, #i #w) (1.105)
Since output is increasing in the level of working capital,
(1.106)
It follows that output is higher under intact financial institutions:
(1.107)
Similarly, a shock to relative TFP such that N*(Qw, #') < No is amplified by lack
of high quality financial institutions.
NN, 0') (Qw i O'Dd d d
Yd (N* (Qw, Oi), Ow) > Yd (N(Qw, OW) OW)d d d d
Yd(N*(Qwi Oi)i Oi) > Yd(N(Qw I Ow) , Ow)d d d d
1.10 Appendix C: A Monetary Model of Liquidity
Supply
In this section, I develop a model of liquidity supply, in which liquidity supply flue-
tuations are caused by two primitive shocks: shocks to the money supply and shocks
to consumers' risk aversion16 . Recall that the model makes three assumptions about
the distribution of liquidity supply:
1. The distribution of liquidity supply is unchanged by financial integration.
2. Liquidity supply is independent from both domestic and foreign productivity,
Aj.
3. Liquidity supply is perfectly correlated across regions.
Consider a model in which labor (denoted L) is the only productive input. Given
Li hired units of labor, output in country i is given by:
Y> = AjF(Lj) (1.108)
In this model, liquidity is money used to hire labor; thus, in this formulation, F
already captures the efficiency of the financial system in allocating liquidity (in other
words, F is log supermodular in L and g).
Assumption 2 1. The price of a unit of labor in terms of money, w, is determined
at the beginning of the period, before all shocks are realized. Agents agree to
supply any amount of labor for the wage w.
2. The price of output is fixed within a period, and is normalized to one.
16The analysis of Broner et al. [Forthcoming] suggests that shocks to the risk aversion of in-
ternational investors is indeed an important driving source of supply driven volatility in emerging
markets.
Agents live for one period and consume at the end of their lives. The preferences
of agents in region i are given by:
E(ui(ci) - vi(Li)) (1.109)
I assume that ui(ci) takes the following stark form:
Ua(ci) ci if c ; co~; (1.110)
-o otherwise.
In this formulation, co,j captures the level of risk aversion of households in region
i. To see this, consider the comparison between two agents, one denoted h with
CO,h = CO,h and one denoted I with co,j < CO,h.
Definition 2 Agent h is more risk averse than agent I if the following condition
holds: for any certain consumption payment c, and any lottery q, if agent h prefers q
over c then so does agent 1.
To see that, according to this standard definition, the condition CO,h > coj implies
that agent h is more risk averse than agent 1, note the following claim:
Claim 2 Agent i prefers a lottery q over a certainty payment of c if and only if the
lottery q never delivers a payment of less than co,j, and E(q) > c.
Proof: Trivially, if the above condition holds, the agent will prefer the lottery: if
c > co,j he is risk neutral between the two lotteries, and if c < co,j his utility
from consuming c is -oo whereas it is positive given the lottery. If the above
condition is violated, it means that one of the following holds: either E(q)
delivers a payment of less than co,j with positive probability, or E(q) < c. If
E(q) delivers a payment of less than co,j with positive probability, then the
agent's expected utility from the lottery is -oo, so it is not preferred over
anything. If E(q) < c, but q always delivers a payment of more than co,j, then
it follows that c > co,j, so the agent is risk neutral with respect to q and c and
would prefer c.
Using this claim, it is easy to see that ht is more risk averse than 1, as the fact that
q never delivers a payment of less than CO,h implies that it never delivers a payment of
less than co,1 < CO,h, so the set of lotteries and certainty payments in which h prefers
the lottery is included in the set of lotteries and certainty payments in which I prefers
the lottery.
Thus, we will think of co as the level of risk aversion of the agents.
Corollary 2 A higher level of co,i implies a higher level of risk aversion.
1.10.1 Liquidity Supply in the Closed Economy
After wages are agreed upon and prices are set, the money supply, Mi, and the level
of risk aversion, co,i, are realized. Agents can choose to hold their money in a safe
(MAh,) or buy stocks in the productive sector (Qi):
M - Qi + MA,i (.111)
The level of Qi is also the level of liquidity supply which can be used to hire
workers. After the productivity shock Ai is realized, the financial system allocates
the liquidity Qi to domestic projects who use it to hire workers:
Qi wiLi(1.112)
After production takes place but before workers are paid, there is a shock to the
ability of the productive sector to make monetary transfers. With probability (1 - 0),
this ability is intact; in this case, wages are paid and two rounds of consumption
follow. In the first round, households use their money holdings (which include wage
payments, wiLi, and money from the safe, Mh,i) to buy output and consume. In
the second round, monetary revenues from sales are redistributed to households as
dividends (denoted d per share), and are used for consumption. The end of the period
consumption is given by:
ci = M ±,i + wiLi + dQi (113
With a small probability 0, the ability of the productive sector to make monetary
transfers collapses. This implies two things: first, wages are not paid to workers. Sec-
ond, revenues from sales cannot be redistributed back to households, so no dividends
are paid. There is only one round of consumption, in which households use the money
which they had kept in the safe (Mhz) to buy consumption goods. It follows that the
end of the period consumption is given by:
ci = Mh,i (1.114)
Simplistically, the shock to the ability of the productive sector to make mone-
tary transfers can be thought of as a strike in the postal services: households who
receive wage payments and dividend payments by mail (and are subject to a cash in
advance constraint) do not receive these payments in time to consume before they
die. Realistically, this shock is meant to capture a shock to the money supply, in
which certain substitutes for money used by the productive sector are no longer val-
ued17 . For example, prior to the sub-prime crisis, mortgage backed securities were
accepted by all as means of payment. In the sub-prime crisis, these securities turned
into illiquid assets, and people were no longer willing to hold these assets without
understanding the value of their components. Thus, it became harder to trade these
assets for consumption goods, which made bonds and cash more desired' 8 . In this
model, agents hold bonds ("money in the safe") precisely to insure against events of
this kind1 9.
To summarize, the timing within a period is as follows:
1. The wage wi and the price of output (normalized to 1) is set.
2. The initial money supply, Mo,i, and the level of risk aversion, co,i, are realized.
",See Eden [2009] for a complete development of this idea.
1 8See Holmstrom [2008] for a complete development of this idea.
19 Results similar to those derived in this section can be derived in a more standard framework, in
which agents hold money to insure against unemployment risk; however, this motive for hoarding
liquidity seems less compelling as the mechanism through which shocks to risk aversion affect liquid-
ity supply. Rather, in this formulation portfolio decisions are motivated by fear of large aggregate
disasters, consistent with the view expressed in Barro [2006].
3. Agents use some of their money to buy stocks and effectively supply liquidity
to the productive sector (and keep the rest in a safe).
4. The productivity shock, Ai, is realized.
5. The financial system allocates liquidity to projects, and production takes place.
6. * With prob. (1-6) (intact): wages are paid, followed by a first round of con-
sumption in which agents trade their wage earnings (wiLi) and their money
holdings (Mh,i) for consumption. The productive sector redistributes rev-
enues from sales back to households in the form of dividends. A second
round of consumption takes place in which the dividends are traded for
consumption.
* With prob. 0 (collapse): the productive sector loses its ability to make
monetary transfers. Wages are not paid and revenues from sales cannot
be redistributed back to households. There is therefore only one round of
consumption, in which households use their money holdings (MAh,) to buy
consumption goods.
Equilibrium
The portfolio decision. Clearly, the agent will reserve at least enough money to
finance co,i units of consumption in case of a collapse (as otherwise his expected utility
is -co):
A,i> co, (1.115)
Denote by d the realized dividend per share of the productive sector, and let Q0
be the equilibrium level of liquidity supply, which the individual agent takes as given.
Agents solve:
max ci - vi(Li) (1.116)
QiMhli
s.t.:
M = Qi + Mh,i (1.11)
Mh, i ± Qjd + wiLi with prob. (1 - 0);
Mh,i with prob. 0.
Afh,i >! Coi
Substituting in the first constraint, this problem can be rewritten as:
max(1 - 0)(Mi - Qj + Qjd + wiLi) + 0(Mi
Qi
M - Qi Co,2i
The derivative of the above with respect to Qj is:
(1 - 0)d - 1 (1.122)
Note that, in equilibrium, the dividends per share are given by:
d = A(1.123)
Assumption 3 The value of 0 is sufficiently small so that, for any realization of Mi
and co,j, the derivative of equation 1.120 with respect to Qj is positive at Q' = Mi -co,j:
(1- 0) M - 1 > 0 (1.124)
MA - co,4
Result 1 Under Assumption 3, the optimal portfolio decision is Mh,i = co,, Q =
M - coi.
Proof: Under Assumption 3, the constraint in equation 1.121 is binding. Thus,
-A/i ~ Qi = co,i-
(1.118)
(1.119)
s.t.
- Qi) - vi(Li) (1.120)
(1.121)
1.10.2 Liquidity Supply in the Integrated Economy
I assume that there is a single currency, so both labor and consumption can be
paid for in either domestic or foreign money. For simplicity, I assume that agents
consume foreign and domestic goods proportional to their shares in output (so that,
regardless of the realizations of money supplies, a unit of domestic output has the
same probability of being consumed as a unit of foreign output).
As in the closed economy, agents choose between keeping money in the safe (Alh,i)
and buying stocks (Qi). In the integrated economy, a stock is a claim on the sales
revenues of the global economy. After portfolio decisions are made, the global finan-
cial system distributes liquidity between foreign and domestic projects in an output
20
maximizing way
Assumption 4 Shocks to the ability of the productive sector to make monetary trans-
fers are i. i. d. across regions.
Equilibrium
The portfolio decision. Because there is a positive probability that both economies
suffer a simultaneous collapse (an event that happens with probability 02), similarly
to the closed economy case the agent will reserve at least enough money to finance
co,i units of consumption:
Mh,i > c0 ,i (1.125)
Denote by d the realized dividend per share of the global productive sector, and
let Q' be the equilibrium level of liquidity supplied by country i which the individual
2 In this model, it is implicitly assumed that consumption is always less than output, and that
there are some units of output which are ex-post "wasted". A natural question is therefore why
the global financial system allocates liquidity between foreign and domestic projects in an output
maximizing way. If we think of the global financial system as a monopoly, this indeed need not be
the case; however, a more competitive structure (for example, one in which the financial system is
composed of many small banks competing for liquidity) would deliver this result, as the expected
real value of a unit of produced output is positive.
agent takes as given. Similarly to the closed economy, agents solve:
max ci - vi(Li)Qi,MQ,i
MA = Qi + Ah,i
s.t.:
ci= {Mh,i + Qjd + w7iLiMh,i + Qjd
Mh,i
with prob. (1 - 0);
with prob. (1 - 0)0;
with prob. 02.
Mh,i >- CO,i
Substituting in the first constraint, this problem can be rewritten as:
max E(Qid) + (1 - 0)wjLj + (Mi - Qj) - vi(Li)
Qi
s.t.
M - Qi ;> coi
The derivative of the above with respect to Qj is:
E(d) - 1
(1.126)
(1.127)
(1.128)
(1.129)
(1.130)
(1.131)
(1.132)
To calculate E(d), note that positive dividends are paid unless both economies
suffer a collapse. If neither suffers a collapse (an event which occurs with probability
(1 - 0)2), dividends per share are d = m .'Ie If economy i suffers a collapse but
economy j doesn't suffer a collapse (events which occur with probability (1-0)0 each),
the dividend per share is positive, as consumers in region i receive some dividends
from their stock holdings in region j. Expected dividends per share are therefore
bounded from below by:
E(d) > (1 -) 2 Ad+ Mem
Q + Qm
(1.133)
Assumption 5 The value of 0 is sufficiently small so that for any realization of Mi
and co,j, the following inequality holds:
(1- )2 Md±Mem - 1 > 0 (1.134)
(Md - CO,d) + (Mem - CO,em)
Result 2 Under Assumption 5, the optimal portfolio decision is Mh,i = coi, Qi
MA - co'i .
Proof: Under Assumption 5, the derivative of equation 1.130 with respect to Qj is
positive at Q0 = Mi - co,:
E(d) - > (0)2d+em -1=(10)2 Md- > 0Qd + Qm (Md - COd) ± (Mem - CO,em) (1.135)
Thus, the constraint in equation 1.131 is binding, so Mi - coj.
Corollary 3 Both under autarky and under financial integration, the liquidity supply
of country i is given by Qj = Mi - co,j.
Assumption 6 The money supply, Mi, and the risk aversion parameter, co,j, are
perfectly correlated across regions and follow time invariant distributions.
Since equilibrium liquidity supply is Qj = Mi - co,j both in the integrated economy
and under autarky, it follows trivially that the assumptions I make on the distribution
of liquidity supply are satisfied.
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Chapter 2
The Inefficiency of Financial
Intermediation in General
Equilibrium
Abstract
In the presence of liquidity constraints, there are rents from supplying liquidity to
constrained entrepreneurs. In partial equilibrium, when the price of inputs is fixed
in terms of liquidity, a financial system facilitates the efficient allocation of resources
by relaxing liquidity constraints. However, in general equilibrium, the presence of a
financial sector has two adverse implications: first, intermediation activities absorb
productive resources, reducing the amount of inputs employed by the productive sec-
tor. Second, financial intermediation bids up the price of inputs in terms of liquidity,
increasing the economy's dependence on the financial sector, which is a source of
crises. Consequently, the presence of a financial sector may reduce equilibrium wel-
fare. I show that an optimal policy is to tilt the tradeoff between production and
liquidity hoarding in favor of liquidity hoarding. The optimal policy serves both to
relax liquidity constraints and to crowd out the financial sector.
JEL Classification: E44, E6, G01, G28, H21
Keywords: Costs of the financial sector, financial intermediation,
output tax, Friedman rule, financial crises
2.1 Introduction
The recent financial crisis resurfaced the concern that too many productive resources
are being absorbed by the financial sector, and that the vulnerability of the real sector
to "mistakes" by the financial sector is too large'. However, intermediation theory
suggests that financial intermediation improves efficiency by improving the allocation
of productive resources and reducing liquidity constraints2 . In this paper I reconcile
these views by demonstrating that while financial intermediation may be vital in
partial equilibrium, in general equilibrium, when the price of inputs is adjustable,
financial intermediation is potentially a wasteful use of productive resources.
I propose that the government can reduce the need for intermediation by tilting the
tradeoff between productive and unproductive saving in favor of unproductive saving.
This can be done either by taxing production or by subsidizing liquidity hoarding.
Increasing the benefits of liquidity hoarding relative to productive investment will
achieve two things: first, it will lower the demand for capital and hence its equilibrium
price, which will enable constrained firms to produce more with the limited funds
available to them. Second, it will lower the returns to financial intermediation; the
financial sector will shrink, freeing up resources for the productive sector.
The proposed policy favors government intervention over private financial inter-
mediation. Despite this, I argue that it is closer in spirit to the free market paradigm.
The system of financial intermediation resembles a privately-run central planning sys-
tem, in which the allocation of the means of production is determined by a group of
"experts" rather than by market forces. The "invisible hand" is replaced by bankers
trying to evaluate market conditions to determine where resources are best allocated.
Of course, unlike central planning systems, the opportunities for bankers to make large
private profits help insure that their decisions are not tainted by political or other
personal considerations; in this sense, financial intermediation is clearly preferable to
central planning. However, experience suggests that even the most well-motivated
central planning system cannot mimic the outcome of perfectly competitive markets,
'See op-eds by Friedman [2009] and Volcker [2010].
2See Gorton and Winton [2003] for a survey of the literature on financial intermediation.
in which prices and production decisions reflect an aggregation of beliefs about supply
and demand, including an entrepreneur's personal knowledge of his own skills and the
demand for his product. In order to achieve a profit-maximizing resource allocation,
financial intermediaries must engage in costly information acquisition, demeaning
monitoring, and exercise harsh repercussions in case of default. By instituting a
simple tax on output that changes the returns to production, liquidity constraints
are relaxed, and production decisions may be taken freely and independently by en-
trepreneurs, without relying on intermediation. The "invisible hand" comes back into
play and allows the allocation of resources to be determined according to traditional
supply and demand forces.
The mechanism in this paper is conceptually related to the Friedman Rule (Fried-
man [1969]). In a Friedman-rule monetary economy, cash-in-advance constraints may
be binding in equilibrium, while in the socially efficient allocation they never bind. In
a monetary framework, the inefficiency of equilibrium stems both from missed con-
sumption opportunities and from a waste of resources spent on "trips to the bank".
The government can help alleviate these inefficiencies by subsidizing money holding.
The model in this paper is somewhat analogous: in equilibrium, entrepreneurs' liq-
uidity constraints are binding, while in the socially efficient allocation they are not.
Similar to the monetary framework, there are two sources of inefficiency in equi-
librium: first, the allocation of production inputs is inefficient. This is somewhat
analogous to the missed consumption opportunities in Friedman's economy: produc-
tive entrepreneurs miss out on high-return production opportunities because they do
not have enough liquidity. The second source of inefficiency is the wasteful resources
spent on financial intermediation. This is analogous to the wasteful resources spent
on trips to the bank in the monetary framework. The proposed subsidy on liquid-
ity hoarding is similar in spirit to the proposition to subsidize money holding in a
Friedman rule economy.
This paper is related to the literature on the government's role in alleviating
liquidity constraints, such as Aiyagari and McGrattan [1998], Holmstrm and Tirole
[1998], Gorton and Huang [2004], and Eden [2010]. In contrast to this paper, the role
of the government in the papers mentioned above is to directly provide loans to al-
leviate liquidity constraints, rather than manipulate prices such that the equilibrium
allocation of capital is efficient. Most closely related to this paper is Eden [2010].
B. Eden argues that the government has a technological advantage over the financial
sector in providing loans. The technological advantage results from the government's
superior ability to verify income, as well as from its preference towards redistribution
which allows it to view default as a transfer. The argument for an output tax pre-
sented here shares the view that the government should play a more prominent role
in alleviating liquidity constraints and crowd out some of the activity of the financial
sector. However, unlike Eden [2010], the focus here is on the productive sector, and
the government's advantage stems from its ability to change the relative price of in-
vestment in a way which allows traditional equilibrium forces to operate. Unlike Eden
[2010], the mechanism through which the government alleviates liquidity constraints
is different in nature from the mechanism employed by the financial sector; it does
not provide the same service more cheaply but rather manipulates equilibrium prices
so that financial services are no longer needed.
This paper also relates to the literature on optimal capital taxation in an envi-
ronment with borrowing constraints. Aiyagari [1995] demonstrates that in an envi-
ronment with borrowing constraints, households have an incentive to over-invest in
capital because of a precautionary saving motive. He concludes that a positive tax
on capital is welfare-improving. The important difference between Aiyagari [1995]
and the setup in this paper is that Aiyagari assumes that firms are never credit con-
strained, so that the rental rate of capital is equated with its marginal product. Here,
I assume that firms are credit constrained; as a consequence, the rental rate of capital
is depressed (even in the absence of any policy intervention, but more so under the
optimal policy). There is therefore an under-incentive to accumulate capital, and the
optimal policy is to subsidize capital supply.
A positive gap between the marginal product of capital and its market price
is possible in this model because entrepreneurs cannot accumulate capital for their
own production needs and must purchase it through a market. Conceptually, in a
growing economy in which future output is not pledgable, this friction would also
prevent entrepreneurs from accumulating sufficient funds to overcome their liquidity
constraints (as in Aiyagari [1994]). This is because the aggregate payment to capital is
always bounded by current output, which may not suffice to account for future returns
to capital. The friction preventing entrepreneurs from accumulating capital for self-
production represents a realistic type of "monetary" friction: in reality, production
requires a variety of capital inputs, where there are some increasing returns in the
production of each input. The investment in capital required for an entrepreneur to
be self-sufficient is far too expensive. The entrepreneur therefore prefers to purchase
inputs through a market.
This paper is also related to the literature on the optimal transaction tax and the
regulation of the financial sector, such as Jacklin [1987] or, more recently, Scheuer
[2009]. The role of the financial sector emphasized in this paper is different from the
one emphasized in the papers listed above, as the focus is on financial intermediation
in a world with no uncertainty rather than on trade in state-contingent claims. Farhi
et al. [2009] focus similarly on the role of the financial sector in providing liquidity, and
argue that the higher return to long run projects (as in Diamond and Dybvig [1983])
may cause aggregate liquidity supply to be too low. This provides further foundation
for the view that liquidity constraints are in some sense inevitable even in the long-
run. This also raises an additional potential benefit of the policy proposed here: with
a sufficiently high output tax, the first best level of output can be achieved with any
level of aggregate liquidity, as the price of capital inputs adjusts appropriately. This
allows the economy to invest in more high yield long term projects, as there is no
need for costly supply of liquidity.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2.2, I lay out a stylized
model of liquidity constraints in an economy with no financial intermediation. I
show that equilibrium welfare can be improved by instituting a tax on production
or, equivalently, a subsidy on liquidity hoarding. In section 2.3, I enrich the model
by introducing a financial intermediation technology, and show that the financial
sector is eliminated under the optimal policy. In section 2.4 I show how these results
generalize to richer environments. In section 2.5, I discuss realistic concerns regarding
the proposed policy. In section 3.8 I conclude.
2.2 Benchmark: an Economy with no Financial
Intermediation
Prior to introducing financial intermediation, I demonstrate that a tax on output
can improve resource allocation by discouraging inefficient entrepreneurs from self-
financing. In section 2.3 I enrich the model by allowing for a costly intermediation
technology.
There is a measure 1 of entrepreneurs indexed x c [0, 1], and a measure 1 of capital
owners. Capital is the single productive input which is at a fixed supply K. Capital
is owned initially by capital owners, who may sell their capital to entrepreneurs (the
scrap value of capital is assumed to be 0, so the only way that capital owners can
consume is by selling their capital to entrepreneurs).
To abstract from distributional concerns, I assume that agents' consumption util-
ity is linear and that ex-ante agents do not know their identity, including whether
they are capital owners or entrepreneurs. Given this assumption, welfare is given
simply by the level of output.
Entrepreneur x is endowed with the following AK production technology:
Y(x) = A(x)K(x) (2.1)
Where K(x) is the capital employed by entrepreneur x, and the productivity
parameter, A(x), is decreasing in x. For simplicity, I assume that there are only two
types of entrepreneurs, so that A(x) takes the following form:
A~ x) = A if X (E [0, 1];(2 )A o s2] (2.2)
A otherwise.
Where:
A > A > 0 (2.3)
Entrepreneurs [0, 1] will be referred to as productive entrepreneurs, and entrepreneurs
(j, 1] will be referred to as unproductive entrepreneurs.
To summarize, the timeline of the model is as follows:
" t = 1: Entrepreneurs buy capital from capital owners.
" t = 2: Entrepreneurs produce and consume.
The efficient economy. The first best allocation of in this economy is character-
ized by the following lemma:
Lemma 8 The welfare maximizing allocation of capital is having the productive en-
trepreneurs employ the entire capital stock, that is: K(x) = 0 for x G ({,1], and
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fo7 K(x)dx = K.
The proof of the lemma stems from the fact that production is most efficient
when carried out by productive entrepreneurs, and there are no decreasing returns to
capital.
Lemma 9 In the absence of any further frictions, the welfare maximizing allocation
is achieved in any equilibrium.
Proof: Consider the equilibrium determination of the rental rate of capital, R. In
equilibrium, R = A: if R < A, entrepreneur 0 has strictly positive demand for
capital. If R > A, aggregate demand for capital is 0. Capital market clearing
therefore implies R = A. At R = A, productive entrepreneurs are indifferent
whether or not to buy capital, whereas unproductive entrepreneurs strictly do
not want to buy capital. Thus, it is concluded that in equilibrium the entire
capital stock is employed by productive entrepreneurs.
Note that this equilibrium can be implemented under various assumptions re-
garding the resources available to entrepreneurs before production takes place. For
example, if output is pledgable, entrepreneurs can buy capital with claims on future
output. Alternatively, this equilibrium can be implemented if it is assumed that
entrepreneurs have a large stock of initial funds which can be used to finance the
purchase of inputs (the exact condition is that productive entrepreneurs have at least
AK initial funds, which is the payment to capital in the competitive equilibrium).
Liquidity constraints. I modify the model to allow for liquidity constraints. I as-
sume that output is not pledgable; capital must be bought with current consumption
goods3 . Initial endowments of consumption goods are identical across entrepreneurs
(and 0 for capital owners): each entrepreneur is born with Q units of consumption
goods, which will be referred to as the entrepreneur's liquidity. Liquidity can be
stored across periods, so that entrepreneurs can choose to store their liquidity and
consume it later.
I assume that the amount of liquidity in the hand of productive entrepreneurs is
not enough to finance the payment to capital in the unconstrained equilibrium:
1
2 Q<AK (2.4)
Entrepreneurs can choose between consuming their endowment and using it to buy
capital. The act of storing the liquidity endowment (and consuming it later) will be
referred to as liquidity hoarding. This should be thought of as using liquidity for other
purposes outside of productive investment. For example, this can include liquidity
services for consumption, or saving in non-productive assets such as treasuries or
consumption loans. The act of using the liquidity endowment to purchase capital will
be referred to as self-financing.
In equilibrium, entrepreneurs with sufficiently high productivity will self-finance,
as they always receive rents from production.
3The assumption that future output is not pledgable is in the spirit of Kehoe and Levine [1993],
Holmstrom and Tirole [1997], Kiyotaki and Moore [1997] or Caballero and Krishnamurthy [2001].
Lemma 10 There are some unproductive entrepreneurs who choose to self-finance
in equilibrium if and only if the following condition holds:
A>k (2.5)
The proof is in the appendix.
Corollary 4 If the condition in equation 2.5 holds, then the equilibrium allocation
of capital is inferior to the first best. Otherwise, output is at its first best level even
though the liquidity constraint is binding for productive entrepreneurs.
Proof: By Lemma 10, if the condition in equation 2.5 holds, some of the capital
stock is employed by unproductive entrepreneurs. This is suboptimal because
the optimal allocation of capital is to have the entire capital stock employed by
productive entrepreneurs. Similarly, if the condition in equation 2.5 is violated,
unproductive entrepreneurs choose not to self finance. The entire capital stock
is therefore employed by productive entrepreneurs, and the first best level of
output is achieved.
The case in which unproductive entrepreneurs employ capital resembles the steady
state outcome in Kiyotaki and Moore [1997]. In their model, the return to capital for
"farmers" (productive entrepreneurs) is strictly higher than the price of employing
capital. This gap cannot be bridged because farmers cannot borrow against future
returns. As a result, some of the capital is allocated to "gatherers", who are less
efficient in production but are able to pledge their entire output.
2.2.1 Optimal Policy
An important implication of the model in this paper is that taxing production and
subsidizing liquidity hoarding can improve the allocation of capital, thus carrying out
the role typically designated for financial intermediation. In this section, I demon-
strate that the government can improve the allocation of resources without using any
form of financial intermediation. The efficient allocation of resources is done without
any transfers of liquidity from one entrepreneur to another. In other words, with liq-
uidity constraints, the equilibrium is constrained inefficient as in Davila et al. [2007]:
the government could theoretically improve allocations simply by prescribing differ-
ent saving behavior. Under an optimal policy, taxes may be redistributed lump sum
to entrepreneurs, but this is done only for the purpose of increasing consumption.
The efficient allocation of resources does not rely on the "intermediation" of liquidity
through the government.4
I assume that the government can set a tax - on output: an entrepreneur must
pay the government a fraction T of any amount of output he produces. Additionally,
the government can set a subsidy c on liquidity hoarding: a unit of stored liquidity
earns interest at a rate of c. It will be shown that both tax instruments are equivalent.
Importantly, both the output tax and the hoarding subsidy lower the relative return
to production for all agents. In particular, agents at the margin who are roughly
indifferent between self financing and liquidity hoarding will switch over to strictly
preferring liquidity hoarding. This frees up productive resources which are then em-
ployed by more productive entrepreneurs, who still find it optimal to produce despite
the relatively higher returns to liquidity hoarding.
Denote by Y(T, C) the output produced in equilibrium when the output tax is r
and the hoarding subsidy is c, and by YFB the first best level of output (which is
achieved when all productive inputs are employed by productive entrepreneurs).
Tables 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 summarize the notation used in this paper (the variables
h and p will be introduced later in the text).
Table 2.1: Policy instruments
Variable Notation
Output tax T
Hoarding subsidy e
I assume that all taxes are collected (or distributed) only after production
takes place. This is important because otherwise the government can bypass the
4 This is an important difference with Eden [2010], in which the government is able to provide
the same service as the financial sector only more cheaply.
Table 2.2: Primitives
Variable Notation
Liquidity endowment Q
Fraction of capital required for intermediation y
Capital stock K
Productivity of productive ent. A
Productivity of unproductive ent. A
Table 2.3: Equilibrium objects
Variable Notation
Price of capital R
Fraction of aggregate liquidity hoarded h
Output Y
liquidity constraints directly by subsidizing liquidity and effectively lending to con-
strained entrepreneurs.
In addition to the tax instruments listed above, it is possible to allow for a lump-
sum transfer (post production), through which the government can distribute tax
revenues among consumers. However, in the formulation above it is not necessary
as the government can redistribute tax revenues as hoarding subsidies (c). It turns
out that in this framework, for any given tax, this form of redistribution is output-
maximizing as it further tilts the tradeoff between production and liquidity hoarding
in favor of liquidity hoarding. In section 2.5.1 I show that given an elastic supply of
capital, the output-maximizing form of redistribution may also include a subsidy on
capital supply.
Let T* = T*(e) and (* = E*(T) be given by:
(1 - T*)AR* = 1 + 6 (2.6)
1(1 -)A~- = 1+e* (2.7)
Where R* is the price of liquidity under which the productive entrepreneurs have
enough liquidity to employ the entire capital stock:
1Q
-Q = R*K -+ R* - (2.8)2 2K
The left hand side of equations 2.6 and 2.7 represent the returns to self-financing
by unproductive entrepreneurs given the price R*. The right hand side represents the
return to liquidity hoarding. It follows that if 7 = r*, or e = 0, unproductive en-
trepreneurs are indifferent between self-financing and liquidity hoarding; in particular,
they are willing to hoard liquidity and refrain from production.
Proposition 7 In an environment without financial intermediation:
1. Output monotonically approaches first best as T approaches T*:
(a) Y(r) > 0, and
(b) Y(T*(E), e) YFB
2. Output monotonically approaches first best as e approaches E*:
(a) OY(T) > 0, and
(b) Y(T,C*(T)) - YFB
The intuition behind Proposition 7 is as follows. The misallocation of capital
results from the fact that productive entrepreneurs do not have sufficient funds to
employ the entire capital stock. Generally speaking, financial intermediation allevi-
ates this problem by increasing the funds in the hands of productive entrepreneurs.
The production tax takes the dual approach to intermediation: rather than increas-
ing the funds in the hands of entrepreneurs, it lowers the equilibrium price of capital,
enabling constrained entrepreneurs to purchase more capital with the funds available
to them. The equilibrium feedback of the production tax is that less efficient users of
capital find it less desirable to produce, thus decreasing the demand for capital. As
a result, the price of capital declines, and productive entrepreneurs who still find it
optimal to produce can afford to purchase more capital.
The assumption that the capital stock is fixed is crucial for this result. The
standard argument states that a tax on output lowers output, because it decreases
the incentives to supply inputs. This channel is shut down here by assuming that the
capital stock is fixed. In section 2.5.1 I show that this concern can be addressed by
issuing a subsidy on capital supply.
To prove the proposition formally, denote by h the fraction of aggregate liquidity
being hoarded. The price of capital is given by the following market clearing condition,
that equates the supply of capital with the demand for capital:
Q(1 - h)
RK Q(-h)>R= Q(1 - h) (2.9)
K
Entrepreneur x chooses to employ capital if and only if:
1 K(1 - r)A(x)- > 1 + C <- (1 - r)A(x) > 1 + C (2.10)
R Q(1 - h)
Since equilibrium requires capital market clearing, it must be the case that prices
are such that productive entrepreneurs, for whom the return to capital is the highest,
are always willing to employ capital. The condition in equation 2.10 must therefore
hold for A(x) = A.
If h = 0, all entrepreneurs strictly prefer to refrain from liquidity hoarding; the
equilibrium will not change with a small increase in T or in e. If 2 > h > 0, unproduc-
tive entrepreneurs must be indifferent between liquidity hoarding and self-financing.
The level of liquidity hoarding is determined by the following equilibrium condition:
(1 - T)A 1=  + C (1 - h) = (1 -T)A k (2.11)Q(1 - h) Q(1 + C)
From the above formulation, it is evident that h increases with r and with c.
Output is given by:
1- 1 - 1 1-h- 1
Y(r, e) = -4 2 K+-A 2.K (2.12)2 1-h 2 1 - h
The first term is the output produced by productive entrepreneurs. The share of
capital that they employ is equal to the share of their liquidity endowments in total
liquidity used for productive purposes: 1 2 h . The second term is the output produced
by unproductive entrepreneurs who choose not to hoard liquidity. The share of the
capital that they employ is similarly given by by their share of liquidity relative to
total liquidity used for productive purposes, 1-h
From equation 2.12, it is easy to see that output is increasing in T and c. Moreover,
1lim h = - (2.13)
T- 4T* 2
1lim h = - (2.14)
F-+<* 2
At h =, the allocation of capital is efficient, as productive entrepreneurs employ
the entire capital stock.
Note that the production tax improves efficiency by increasing the set of en-
trepreneurs who find it optimal not to produce but to hoard liquidity. At first glance,
this may seem paradoxical: compared to the efficient economy, the problem in the
liquidity-constrained economy is that there is not enough liquidity in the hands of
the productive sector. Yet, to improve efficiency, we are asking agents to refrain from
using their liquidity for production, lowering the amount of liquidity in the system
even further. The key to understanding why this works is to realize the sense in which
there is not enough liquidity in the liquidity-constrained economy: there is not enough
liquidity to allow for input prices to account for their returns. As demonstrated by
the efficient economy case, if liquidity was sufficiently abundant, the price of capital
would be bid up to the marginal product of the most efficient entrepreneur. Thus,
only the productive entrepreneurs would find it optimal to produce, and resources
would be allocated efficiently. The problem with not having enough liquidity is that
input prices are depressed. so unproductive entrepreneurs find it optimal to produce.
The direct way to improve welfare is to discourage unproductive entrepreneurs from
producing.
Note that the reason that liquidity hoarding should be encouraged is that in
general equilibrium, the price of inputs adjusts so that productive entrepreneurs can
hire more inputs with the limited funds available to them. The negative association of
liquidity hoarding with crisis amplification is consistent in partial equilibrium, when
the prices of inputs are fixed 5 . I address this issue in section 2.5.2, in which I consider
an environment with sticky prices.
2.3 An Economy with Financial Intermediation
The gap between the market price of capital and the marginal return to capital is
fertile grounds for the emergence of a financial intermediation system. Financial
intermediation transmits liquidity from unproductive entrepreneurs to productive en-
trepreneurs at some cost. This could be a cost of monitoring (as in Townsend [1979],
Diamond [1984], and Williamson [1986]), of acquiring information (as in Leland and
Pyle [1977], Campbell and Kracaw [1980], and Boyd and Prescott [1986]), or of trans-
acting (as in Benston and Smith [1976]). Typically, in models of financial intermedi-
ation, banks reduce the cost associated with reallocating liquidity from unproductive
to productive entrepreneurs; however, there are typically still resources which need to
be spent in order to overcome the initial friction preventing entrepreneurs from bor-
rowing from lenders directly. Realistically, the large amount of productive resources
spent on financial intermediation is a source of concern6 .
I proceed in modifying the framework to allow for financial intermediation. I
assume that agents have an option to activate an intermediation technology. If agent
y wants to make use of the technology available to entrepreneur x, he may do so
indirectly by buying capital and allowing entrepreneur x to use it. The agents agree
on a repayment rate, ?r per unit of capital, to be paid after production takes place.
For simplicity, I assume that in order to activate this intermediation technology, agent
y must employ units of capital per unit of capital deposited with agent x. This
can be thought of as the cost of monitoring, contracting, etc7 . If agent x uses capital
5For examples of the negative implications of liquidity hoarding in crises situations, see Caballero
and Krisnamurthy [2008] or Caballero and Simsek [2010].
6The profits of the financial sector in the US range between 4-8% of GDP. This suggests that the
resources spent on intermediation are non-negligible.
'In many models of financial intermediation, there is an element of increasing returns: the more
capital intermediated the less the cost of intermediation per unit of capital. I abstract from this and
assume that a constant fraction of capital is absorbed by the financial sector. It is easy to show that
the results in this section generalize as long as the total amount of resources spent on intermediation
increases with the amount of intermediation.
owned by agent y, I say that agent x uses intermediated capital.
To summarize, the timeline is modified as follows:
" t - 1: Entrepreneurs buy capital from capital owners. Entrepreneurs choose
among the following options:
- Self financing: entrepreneurs buy capital and use it to activate their own
production technology.
Liquidity hoarding: entrepreneurs do not buy capital but store their
liquidity endowment for later consumption.
Intermediation: entrepreneurs buy capital and deposit it with the en-
trepreneur of their choice. A fraction y of the capital they purchase is used
for activating the intermediation technology.
" t = 2: Production and taxation. Entrepreneurs consume the net-of-tax output
that they produced and the liquidity that they have stored. Capital owners
consume the sales revenues from capital.
Lemma 11 In equilibrium, only the productive entrepreneurs, x G [0, 1], use inter-
mediated capital. The repayment rate is the entire output produced by the intermedi-
ated capital (r - A).
The proof is in the appendix.
The assumption that using financial intermediation is costly while taxation is free
requires some elaboration. In this model, the superiority of an output tax stems
from the assumption that tax collection is cheaper than financial intermediation. I
dedicate section 2.5.3 to elaborate on this assumption.
2.3.1 Is Financial Intermediation Welfare-Improving?
Prior to considering optimal policy in an environment with financial intermediation, I
address the question of whether or not the existence of an intermediation technology
is welfare-improving in an environment with no government policy. It will be shown
later that the optimal policy is such that there is no financial intermediation in
equilibrium.
It turns out that whether the presence of an intermediation technology improves
equilibrium welfare depends on the primary alternative for financial intermediation.
If financial intermediation comes mainly as a substitute for liquidity hoarding or
non-productive savings, then it reduces welfare in equilibrium. It may improve equi-
librium welfare if it comes mainly as a substitute for self-financing. I demonstrate
this principle with two examples:
Example 1: Assume that the productivity distribution is given by A > 0 and A = 0.
As long as the price of inputs is positive, unproductive entrepreneurs will never
choose to produce. Since the productivity of all unproductive entrepreneurs is
high, in equilibrium they will all choose to produce.
Consider first the equilibrium with no financial intermediation. In this case,
unproductive entrepreneurs choose to hoard liquidity. The entire capital stock
is employed by productive entrepreneurs, so the total output in the economy
with no intermediation (ni) is equal to the first best level of output:
y A = 1 = FB (2.15)
Consider now the equilibrium with financial intermediation. The high prof-
its generated from capital in the hands of productive entrepreneurs provide an
incentive for unproductive entrepreneurs to employ the intermediation technol-
ogy. Thus, all of the liquidity in the economy is used to hire capital (either for
intermediation or for production). The equilibrium is inferior to the no interme-
diation case, because some of the capital stock is used for intermediation rather
than for production. Specifically, only a fraction 1 + (1 - p) of the capital
stock is employed by the productive sector, while a fraction jp is employed in
intermediation. Equilibrium output with financial intermediation (wi) is lower
than equilibrium output without financial intermediation:
Ywi = A(- + (1 - p-).K < AR =YFB (2.16)2 2
By absorbing productive resources, the existence of a financial intermediation
technology reduces equilibrium welfare. The key is that financial intermedia-
tion does not improve the allocation of capital, but only transfers some of the
production revenues from productive to unproductive entrepreneurs. The ac-
tivation of the intermediation technology is costly from a social perspective,
but emerges in equilibrium because it enables a transfer of wealth to those who
activate it.
Example 2: Let A > 0, and assume that the productivity distribution is given by
A = A and A = AA (where A < 1). In the absence of financial intermediation,
if the liquidity constraint is sufficiently tight (Q is sufficiently small), the equi-
librium price of capital is sufficiently depressed that profits from self financing
are positive even for relatively unproductive entrepreneurs. Thus, equilibrium
output in the no intermediation case (ni) is given by:
1 - 1 -Y i = -AK + -AAK (2.17)2 2
If the capital requirement for the financial intermediation technology is not too
large, financial intermediation can improve equilibrium welfare. Importantly, in
this case the decision to use the intermediation technology is efficient: financial
intermediation will be employed in equilibrium only if it improves welfare. To
see this, note that unproductive entrepreneurs will choose to employ the inter-
mediation technology only if (1- p) > A. This is also the condition under which
intermediation improves welfare. If the intermediation technology is employed,
output is given by:
Y* -AK + -(1 - p)Ak > Y T" (2.18)2 2
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Where the inequality stems from the fact that the intermediation technology is
employed in equilibrium only if (1 - p) > A.
The examples above demonstrate that the existence of an intermediation technol-
ogy has a mixed effect on equilibrium welfare. The intermediation technology can
help improve the allocation of capital by providing a more productive alternative for
unproductive entrepreneurs who choose to self-finance. However, the employment
of the intermediation technology is unjustified from a welfare perspective when the
alternative to intermediation is unproductive savings. The employment of the in-
termediation technology is wasteful as it absorbs productive resources and does not
improve the equilibrium allocation of capital.
There have been recent proposals to institute a "transaction tax", which are aimed
at discouraging the usage of financial intermediation. This model suggest that the
welfare implications of such policies depend crucially on the most attractive alterna-
tive use of funds: an intermediation tax may be beneficial if it encourages liquidity
hoarding, but may be harmful if it encourages self-financing. However, there is a
strong argument for eliminating subsidies for intermediation. It can be argued that
the inability of the government to commit not to bail out the financial sector during
a crisis prevents agents from realizing the entire social cost of intermediation; hence,
financial intermediation is effectively subsidized. In section 2.5.2, I demonstrate that
during a financial crisis, it is indeed optimal for the government to bail out the finan-
cial sector. This effective subsidy may therefore be corrected by a "normal time" tax
on financial intermediation. However, it will be shown that under the optimal policy
there is no financial intermediation.
An alternative specification of the cost of intermediation is to allow for the pos-
sibility of a financial crisis: after prices are set, there is some probability 0 that
the financial sector collapses and intermediation is no longer possible. Consider the
specification of example 1, in which A > 0 and A = 0. In the absence of financial
intermediation, output is at its first best level. With financial intermediation,
A(I + (-p))K with prob. 1 - ;Ya =~ _ (2.19)
A( +0) with prob. 0.
Note that with the possibility of a financial crisis, the presence of a financial sector
reduces equilibrium welfare, even if the financial system does riot absorb any resources
(p = 0). This is because the presence of a financial sector essentially bids up the
price of inputs in terms of liquidity, to the point at which productive entrepreneurs
are only able to employ half of the capital stock with their liquidity endowment.
The rest of the capital stock is employed by unproductive entrepreneurs, using the
financial intermediation technology. Thus, if there is a shock to the financial sector,
only half of the capital stock can be employed in production. The economy's reliance
on financial intermediation therefore reduces welfare, as financial crises are associated
with larger unemployment and lower output.
2.3.2 Optimal Policy
I proceed in considering the equilibrium of this economy given a certain tax policy.
As in section 2.2.1, I allow for an output tax T and a subsidy ( on liquidity hoarding.
The two tax instruments remain equivalent under this richer environment.
Let A denote the most profitable use of capital for unproductive entrepreneurs:
A = max{A, (1 - p)A} (2.20)
And let 7* = T*(e) and c* = E*(T) be given by:
(1T- *)A R* = 1 + e (2.21)
1(-)A R* = 1 + * (2.22)
Recall that R* denotes the price of liquidity under which the productive en-
trepreneurs have enough liquidity to employ the entire capital stock (equation 2.8).
Lemma 12 Proposition 7 generalizes to environments with financial intermediation,
with T* and c* defined as above.
Proof: The economy is equivalent to one in which the distribution of technology is
given by:
A~x) = A if x E [0, j;(.3A (x) {2tews (2.23)
A otherwise.
The lemma follows immediately from applying Proposition 7 to this economy.
Consider an economy in which financial intermediation is employed, that is A =
(1 - p)A. Employing the financial intermediation technology plays the role of self-
financing in the environment without intermediation: it is an inefficient use of capital.
and should be discouraged. Welfare is improved with a policy that tilts the trade-
off in favor of liquidity hoarding. The first best is achieved when all unproductive
entrepreneurs hoard liquidity. The financial sector vanishes.
This result may seem counterintuitive in light of the large welfare loss associated
with financial crises. In section 2.5.2 I demonstrate that this is because of the partial
equilibrium nature of crises: when prices are fixed, a sudden disappearance of financial
intermediation is harmful.
Financial intermediation is inefficient in general equilibrium. The presence of liq-
uidity constraints give rise to large profit opportunities; but taking advantage of these
opportunities only bids up the price of capital and worsens the liquidity constraints
of productive entrepreneurs. By instituting policies which discourage production and
favor liquidity hoarding, the price of inputs declines and liquidity constraints are
relaxed.
2.4 Generality
The principle that encouraging liquidity hoarding (and discouraging production) is
welfare-improving in models with liquidity constraints is very general.
Consider the following general setup. Each entrepreneur x E [0, 1] is endowed
with a production function, F(K, x), where F is twice differentiable in K and sat-
isfies K > 0 2 FK < 0, and F(K, x) is measurable in x. The liquidity of
entrepreneur x is given by Q(x) > 0, where Q(-) is measurable. For completeness, I
consider the richer environment in which a financial intermediation technology exists;
the parameter p = 1 captures the situation in which the returns to intermediation
are 0, so the environment is similar to one with no intermediation.
For example, the general setup above can accommodate a model in which all
entrepreneurs are endowed with the same decreasing returns technology, but have
different amounts of liquidity. This case is interesting as the distributional impli-
cations are very different from the one in the two-type example presented in this
paper. In the two-type example, the first best allocation is one in which the produc-
tive types are the only ones producing. In the model in which all entrepreneurs are
endowed with the same decreasing returns technology, the first best allocation has
equal production by all entrepreneurs; in both cases, the tax on output (or subsidy on
liquidity hoarding) helps bring the liquidity constrained economy closer to the first
best allocation.
The main result of this paper generalizes:
Proposition 8 Assume that taxes are such that equilibrium output is inferior to the
first best. Increasing the tax on output (r) or the subsidy on liquidity hoarding (c)
increases equilibrium output.
The proof is in the appendix. The line of argument is similar to the particular
case of two types.
2.5 Realistic Concerns
The unambiguous conclusion of the model in sections 2.2 and 2.3 is that, in an
environment with liquidity constraints, a tax on production (or a subsidy on liquidity
hoarding) increases output. This seemingly paradoxical conclusion obviously raises
some realistic concerns. In this section, I lay out these concerns and discuss their
implications for the optimal policy.
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2.5.1 Elastic Supply of Inputs
A realistic concern with the above proposal is that it depresses the price of inputs.
This will adversely affect the incentive to supply inputs, thereby potentially reducing
equilibrium output.
Whether the net effect of a production tax is positive or negative depends of course
on the elasticity of input supply. If input supply is relatively inelastic, the improve-
ment in resource allocation will dominate. However, if input supply is highly elastic,
the decline in input supply may offset the returns from better resource allocation.
Theoretically, this concern can easily be addressed by providing a subsidy for
input supply. As output increases with the production tax, in theory there is enough
revenue to leave the incentives to supply inputs unchanged, or even to increase them.
If a production tax is instituted and a balanced budget is kept, redistributing some
of the revenue as an input subsidy will be optimal.
It is worth noting that the proposition to tax production and subsidize input
supply emerges naturally in frameworks with liquidity constraints, as it essentially
relaxes liquidity constraints by allowing the returns to capital to increase beyond the
current supply of liquidity. However, as demonstrated in section 2.2, what matters is
not the just the amount of liquidity per-se but rather also the distribution of liquidity
among entrepreneurs. An input subsidy cannot, on its own, bring the economy to
its first best allocation, as it is unable to change the distribution of liquidity supply
in the right way (in fact, a higher capital supply will tend to imply that capital is
cheaper from the entrepreneur's perspective, which will encourage more inefficient
entrepreneurs to self-finance). In what follows I show that the optimal size of the
input subsidy given a specific tax schedule is positive, but only given the optimal
policy is it equal to the returns to capital in the competitive equilibrium without
liquidity constraints.
I enrich the framework by allowing for a capital supply decision. Assume that
capital owners are endowed with a technology to produce capital. The cost of pro-
ducing K units of capital is e = G(K) units of effort, where the cost function G(K)
101
is convex. The utility of capital owners is modified to include a linear disutility of
effort:
u(c, e) = c - e (2.24)
To summarize, the timeline is modified to include a period t = 0 in which capital
owners decide how much capital to supply:
" t = 0: Capital owners produce capital.
" t = 1: Entrepreneurs buy capital from capital owners (and decide whether to
self-finance, hoard liquidity, or employ financial intermediation).
" t = 2: Production and taxation. Entrepreneurs consume net-of-tax production
and stored liquidity. Capital owners consume the (subsidized) sales revenues
from their capital.
Lemma 13 Denote by R the return to the capital owner per unit of supplied capital.
In equilibrium, the marginal cost of producing capital is equated with R:
G'(K) = R (2.25)
To see this, note that the capital owners maximize:
max RK - G(K) (2.26)
K
The first order condition of the problem above delivers the lemma.
Corollary 5 In the absence of a capital subsidy and in the presence of liquidity con-
straints, capital supply is depressed compared to the first best.
To see this, note that in the absence of a capital subsidy the return to the capital
owner per unit of produced capital is the market price of capital: R = R. In the
first best, the price of capital is RFB = A, whereas in the constrained environment,
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R must be lower as a non-trivial set of unproductive entrepreneurs find it optimal to
produce. In other words, since not all output can be pledged, the returns to capital
are bounded by the liquidity supply.
Lemma 14 The supply of capital decreases with the output tax and the hoarding
subsidy.
To prove this lemma, note that the price of capital (as given by equation 2.9) is
decreasing in the output tax and the hoarding subsidy, as these decrease the demand
for capital. As the price of capital is a component of the compensation of capital
(which may also be taxed or subsidized), a lower price implies a lower incentive to
supply capital.
This result demonstrates that the optimality of an output tax (or a liquidity sub-
sidy) relies heavily on the assumption that the government is able to subsidize input
supply. It has been suggested in the literature that there may be non-trivial commit-
ment problems with the promise to subsidize capital inputs ex-post (as in Kydland
and Prescott [1977]): once capital is given, there may be an incentive to expropriate
it. In the absence of the ability to subsidize input supply, there is an intermediate
optimal output tax, which balances the improvement of resource allocation which the
disincentive to supply inputs.
Implicitly, the assumption that the government is able to subsidize capital means
that the government is not subject to the same liquidity constraints as the en-
trepreneurial sector. It is able to pledge post-production tax revenues and credibly
commit to pay these as capital subsidies. However, importantly, the fact that the
government is able to pledge future revenue is not enough to bring the economy to
a first best allocation; it is still necessary to employ a production tax or a hoard-
ing subsidy to overcome the central problem of the distribution of liquidity among
entrepreneurs.
It is worth noting that unless the first best policy is implemented (and capital
allocation is efficient), the optimal compensation to capital will be less than in the
first best. For example, in an equilibrium with no financial intermediation, subsidizing
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capital may result in a less efficient allocation of capital ex-post: since the price of
capital declines with the capital supply, more entrepreneurs find it optimal to self-
finance as the supply of capital increases. The optimal subsidized return to capital
(R) is therefore less than the average product of capital. While subsidizing capital
supply may still be optimal, doing so does not eliminate liquidity constraints, but in
some sense even exacerbates them.
2.5.2 Sticky Input Prices
In the model presented in sections 2.2 and 2.3, liquidity hoarding is welfare improving;
this may seem counterintuitive in light of the recent crisis, in which liquidity hoarding
was widely viewed as a source of amplification. While in general equilibrium liquidity
hoarding should be encouraged, I demonstrate that in partial equilibrium, when the
price of inputs is fixed, liquidity hoarding is harmful. This also suggests that the
transition towards a more efficient equilibrium with an output tax or a hoarding
subsidy can be costly in the short run. Both points will be demonstrated with the
following modification to the model which allows for sticky input prices.
Let YP denote the output produced by capital that was hired with productive
entrepreneurs' liquidity, and let Y' denote the output produced by capital that was
hired with unproductive entrepreneurs' liquidity. Note that total output is:
Y =YP +Y (2.27)
Financial crises. Assume that the price of inputs, R is fixed at R = Ro, that
taxes are fixed at To and co, and that Ro is the equilibrium price given ro and Co.
Assume further that the equilibrium is such that there is financial intermediation in
equilibrium. Consider a sudden shock to the intermediation technology, which causes
intermediation to be impossible. Alternatively, this could be a "flight to quality"
episode, in which savers suddenly acquire a strong preference for unproductive savings
over productive investment through the financial sector.
Since financial intermediation is used in equilibrium, it must be the case that
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productive entrepreneurs self-finance. Since R is fixed at R0 , the amount of capital
that productive entrepreneurs can hire with their liquidity endowments remains the
same. Therefore, the amount of output produced by capital purchased by productive
entrepreneurs remains the same:
YP = YOP (2.28)
However, importantly, the output produced by capital hired by unproductive en-
trepreneurs declines. This is because unproductive entrepreneurs either switch to
liquidity hoarding (which produces no output), or switch to self-financing which is,
from their perspective, an inferior production technology. Thus,
YU < YO (2.29)
It follows that output drops as a result of the financial crisis:
Y = YP +YU < YO" +Y =Y (2.30)
This result suggests that there is an argument for bailing out the financial sector
during financial crises, regardless of whether or not the size of the financial sector is
efficient in general equilibrium. In partial equilibrium, prices are such that resource
allocation is optimal only in the presence of a well-functioning financial sector.
The short-run implications of an output tax or a hoarding subsidy. Con-
sider an increase in r, ro H- T > o. According to proposition 7, after prices adjust,
the equilibrium is superior. Consider the immediate impact that takes place when R
is fixed.
The implication of the higher production tax is that less entrepreneurs find it
optimal to self-finance or engage in intermediation. Once prices adjust, this works
towards improving efficiency, because the price of inputs decline and a more selective
set of entrepreneurs can each afford to hire more inputs. However, with R fixed, the
105
level of production by each of the remaining self-financing entrepreneurs stays the
same; as long as prices are fixed, the amount of inputs each entrepreneur can hire is
given by his liquidity constraint. The resources previously employed by entrepreneurs
who decided to switch to liquidity hoarding become unemployed, and the output
produced by them forgone.
Because of price stickiness, an increase in taxes is associated with a drop in output
and a rise in unemployment. This suggests that the output tax should be increased
gradually, and that the increase should be announced well in advance to allow for the
prices of inputs to respond accordingly.
These results trivially apply for a hoarding subsidy as well. An increase in the
hoarding subsidy (for example, an increase in the Federal Funds Rate) is recessionary
in the short run, while input prices are fixed. However, a sustained high rate of return
on unproductive savings increases equilibrium output.
2.5.3 The Cost of Intermediation Compared to the Cost of
Tax Collection
The model presented in this paper assumes a certain asymmetry between the private
sector and the government: while it is costly for the financial sector to transfer goods
from one agent to another, the government is able to collect and redistribute taxes
at not cost. In this section I justify this asymmetry.
The assumption that financial intermediation is more costly than tax collection
seems empirically relevant. Currently, the amount of resources employed in tax col-
lection is negligible compared to the resources absorbed by the financial sector. The
recent financial crisis as well as other occurrences of financial fragility suggest that the
social cost of financial intermediation may in fact be even larger than that calculated
based on employment and profit shares.
Realistically, instituting a large tax on production may increase tax collection costs
substantially, as the incentives to evade taxes are higher. In this section I present
evidence that suggests that, at least for a small increase in the production tax, there
106
will be no increase associated with collection costs. Since, by Lemma 12, output is
monotonically increasing in the production tax, this suggests a benefit to increasing
the production tax at least by a small amount. Further, I suggest that the marginal
savings generated from reducing the size of the financial sector are potentially large.
Though it sounds plausible, there is no clear evidence that the direct cost of tax
collection increases with tax revenues. Yesin [2004] provides data from the IRS Data
Book regarding the operating costs and total tax collection for the years 1976-2000
(table 2 in Yesin [2004]). Using these figures, as well as US nominal GDP from the
FRED database, I calculate the operating costs and the tax revenues as a fraction of
GDP. Figure 2-1 presents the linear regression of the share of operating costs on the
share of collection. If anything, this relationship is decreasing.
Collection costs as a function of collection
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Figure 2-1: Tax costs
Similarly, a small cross-country comparison suggests that the operating costs of
the tax collection agency do not increase dramatically with the average tax rate.
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Table 3 in Yesin [2004] provides figures for the total tax revenues and the budget
of the tax collection agency for a few countries. Using WEO data, I calculate the
total tax revenues and the budget of the tax collection agency as a percent of GDP.
The results in in table 2.4.8 Regressing the budget of the collection agency on the
tax revenue results in a slightly negative coefficient. Indeed, the numbers suggests
that the average tax rate is not the primary determinant of the collection costs.
For example, Australia spends 0.7% of GDP collecting an average tax rate of 24%.
Norway spends only 0.3% of GDP collecting an average tax rate of 40%.
Table 2.4: Tax revenues and the budgets of collection agencies
Country Total tax revenue (% GDP) Budget of tax collection agency (%GDP)
Australia 24 0.7
Canada 16 0.4
Israel 27 0.3
Norway 40 0.3
US 19 0.1
Of course, to determine how collection costs would change with an increase in
taxes requires more rigorous econometric analysis. However, both the time series
comparison for the US and the cross country comparison suggest that the marginal
cost of additional taxation is not high.
Moreover, it is not necessarily the case that in order to increase the production
tax the total tax revenue must increase. Rather, the production tax can (and in the
framework of this model, should) substitute for various taxes on inputs, such as labor
income taxation and capital taxation (which, in this model, should be subsidized).
A better resource allocation can be achieved simply by changing the composition of
taxes, without changing the total tax revenue.
I now turn to the marginal cost of financial intermediation. According to Friedman
[2009], from the 1950s to the 1980s, the finance sector accounted for 10% of all profits
earned by US corporations. According to Friedman, this share has risen to 35%
in the years 2000-2005. This provides some measure of the increase in the cost of
81 exclude Turkey, because the figures reported in Yesin [2004] combined with the current priced
GDP provided by the WEO produce unreasonable figures of tax collection way above 100% of GDP.
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financial intermediation. A crude measure of the increase in the quantity of financial
intermediation is the increase in the bank credit of commercial banks. Using data
from the FRED database 9, I estimate that bank credit as a percent of GDP increased
by about 160% from the 1970's to the years 2000-2005. Thus, an increase of 160%
in intermediation is associated with a 250% increase in costs. This suggests that
increasing the quantity of intermediation by 1% increases the costs of operating the
financial sector by about 1.5%. The positive marginal cost of financial intermediation
implies that downsizing the extent of financial intermediation will reduce its costs
substantially.
Further, note that the figures above reflect only the normal operating costs of
the financial sector, and do not include the costs of the fragility induced by financial
crises. It is likely that with a smaller financial sector, the vulnerability of the economy
to financial crises will be reduced. Moreover, it is possible to argue that the crisis
itself was due to excess capacity in the financial sector - in which case, the marginal
benefit of reducing the size of the financial sector is very high.
To summarize, since the marginal increase in collection cost is negligible compared
to the marginal savings generated from crowding out the financial sector, the net effect
of a marginal increase in the production tax is positive (note that the crowding out
of the financial sector is a lower bound on the size of the benefits from increasing the
production tax, as the production tax may also imply a better equilibrium allocation
of capital among entrepreneurs):
BY BCollection costs tax revenues 8Financial sector Blntermediation 0
Br - tax revenues ,, r -aIntermediation (9T
=0 >0 >0 <0
(2.31)
9Series: TOTBKCR, Bank Credit of All Commercial Banks
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2.6 Conclusion
The prevailing sense that the size of the financial sector is "too large" may at first
seem at odds with traditional economic theory. Typically, in hyper-competitive envi-
ronments such as the financial sector, the profits of the sector reflect its contribution
to output. However, as Paul Volcker elegantly expresses in The New York Review of
Books, it is questionable whether the financial sector indeed adds surplus which can
justify its profits:
"Has the contribution of the modern world of finance to economic growth
become so critical as to support remuneration to its participants beyond
any earlier experience and expectations? Does the past profitability of
and the value added by the financial industry really now justify profits
amounting to as much as 35 to 40 percent of all profits by all US corpora-
tions? Can the truly enormous rise in the use of derivatives, complicated
options, and highly structured financial instruments really have made a
parallel contribution to economic efficiency?"
-Paul Volcker, 'The Time We Have Is Growing Short', The New York Review of
Books, June 24th 2010.
This paper suggests that the answer to the questions above is negative. The profits
of the financial sector do not reflect its contribution to output. Rather, people are
willing to pay for intermediation not because of the surplus it generates, but because it
transfers surplus to people with wealth who do not have highly productive investment
opportunities of their own. The payment to the financial sector reflects the return to
intermediation from the perspective of its clients. An immediate conclusion of this is
that if the government can freely institute transfers, intermediation is wasteful as the
transfer of wealth can be done more cheaply through taxation. Realistically, even if
the government is unable to transfer resources freely between individuals, it is likely
that the transfer implied by financial intermediation is a socially undesirable one, as
it transfers surplus from liquidity constrained entrepreneurs and small businesses to
wealthy liquidity suppliers.
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Unlike the simplified model presented here, in reality there are limited high-profit
investment opportunities. This further increases the amount spent on intermediation,
as resources must be spent in order to compete for the opportunity to take advantage
of these. Of course, this rat-race is wasteful from a social perspective. As Friedman
[2009] points out:
"Perversely, the largest individual returns seem to flow to those whose
job is to ensure that microscopically small deviations from observable
regularities in asset price relationships persist for only one millisecond
instead of three. These talented and energetic young citizens could surely
be doing something more useful."
-Benjamin Friedman, 'Overmighty finance levies a tithe on growth'. The Financial
Times, August 26 2009.
The inefficiency generated by the large amount of resources spent on financial
intermediation calls for structural change. The model in this paper suggests that a
simple tax policy can help reduce the size of the financial sector, while improving
the equilibrium allocation of capital. Previous policy proposals have focused on the
role of a transaction tax, which essentially taxes intermediation. In this paper it is
demonstrated that while this may improve welfare in some equilibria, it may also be
harmful as it encourages inefficient self-financing. The unambiguous recommendation
that emerges from this paper is a simple tax on production, coupled with a subsidy
on unproductive savings ("liquidity hoarding") and a subsidy on input supply.
A tax on production and a subsidy on unproductive savings discourage inefficient
usage of capital. Only entrepreneurs with truly productive investment opportunities
will find it optimal to self-finance; similarly, only intermediation which is relatively
cheap and highly productive will still be profitable in equilibrium. This improves
the equilibrium allocation of capital among entrepreneurs, and increases the share of
capital employed in the productive sector. The subsidy on input supply helps correct
the incentive to supply capital when the returns to capital are depressed.
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In addition to the benefits mentioned above, an economy that relies less on fi-
nancial intermediation is, at the very least, less exposed to financial crises; possibly,
financial crises are eliminated entirely as intermediation becomes simpler and less
profitable. The possibility of using simple policies to reduce the need for financial
intermediation without compromising on the welfare improving resource allocation
associated with the financial sector is particularly appealing given that the real cost
of financial crises is large.
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2.7 Appendix
2.7.1 Proof of Lemma 10
First, note that the price of capital, R, is given by the following equation:
Q(1 - h) = RK (2.32)
Where It is the fraction of hoarded liquidity. As productive entrepreneurs always
strictly prefer to produce, h < j. It follows that:
1(1 - h) >- (2.33)
2
Hence,
(1I h)Q IR- > (2.34)K K
The unproductive entrepreneur's return to production is A-. The return to liq-
uidity hoarding is 1. Hence, entrepreneurs will choose to self-finance if:
1 AA- > 1 A > R > 2(2.35)
2.7.2 Proof of Lemma 11
I first prove that only productive entrepreneurs use intermediated capital, given the
assumption that the repayment rate is r = A. Assume by way of contradiction that
there is an unproductive entrepreneur that uses intermediated capital. Thus, there
is an agent y who finds it optimal to deposit capital in the hands of an unproductive
entrepreneur. This means that the repayment agreement is at least r A, because
otherwise y would do better by depositing the capital in the hands of a productive
entrepreneur. But, as the return to capital in the hands of the unproductive en-
trepreneur is only A < A, it follows that the unproductive entrepreneur loses from
this contract and would not agree to this repayment rate.
Next, I prove that the repayment rate is r = A. For r > A, productive en-
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trepreneurs would not agree to the contract. Assume by way of contradiction that
r < A. The demand for intermediated capital is strictly positive, as productive
entrepreneurs profit from intermediated capital. It follows that r = A.
2.7.3 Proof of Proposition 8
Consider an equilibrium in which the output is less than first best. For simplicity
assume that the first best allocation is unique. The fact that output is inferior to the
first best implies that there is a set of entrepreneurs of positive measure, E, such that
these entrepreneurs employ less capital than they do in the first best.
It follows that for x E E:
aF(K,x) > FB> R (2.36)
9K
The liquidity constraint is binding for these entrepreneurs, so they use all of their
liquidity to self-finance. For any x E E, the capital self-employed by entrepreneur x
is:
Q(x) = RK(x) (2.37)
Note that T and e do not change the tradeoff between self-financing and interme-
diation, but only the return to liquidity hoarding relative to these two options.
Denote by r the return to intermediation.
Claim 3 For every x e E,
(1( p)r < BK (2.38)
aK
And:
r max ,x) (2.39)
xEE 8a
Where Kx is the total capital employed by the production technology of entrepreneur
x.
The first inequality stems from the optimality of entrepreneur x's decision to
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self-finance. The second equality results from the optimal decision of where to inter-
mediate capital.
The demand for capital from x E Ec (where Ec denotes the complement of E) is
given by:
max (1 - T)(F(K(x), x)+r(1 -p)Ki(x))+ (1+ ±)(Q(x) - (K(x)+Ki(x))) (2.40)
K(x),Ki (x)
R(K(x) + Ki(x)) < Q(x) (2.41)
The demand for capital (K(x) + Ki(x)) decreases with r and 6. It follows that the
equilibrium price of capital is lower when T and c are higher, so that entrepreneurs
in E can hire more capital. Output increases.
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Chapter 3
Global Imbalances in a Monetary
Model of Liquidity Constraints
Abstract
I construct a monetary model in which liquidity constraints emerge in equilibrium.
For fast-growing economies, financial integration is associated with lower consump-
tion and increased consumption volatility. Foreigners extract rents from supplying
liquidity to the constrained productive sector. Input prices appreciate, but equilib-
rium output remains unchanged. This results in lower consumption, as some of the
output is used as payment to liquidity suppliers. The magnitude of the flows implied
by the model are roughly 2%-6% of GDP. In the presence of sticky input prices, the
reliance on foreign liquidity supply is a potential source of instability, as contractions
in foreign liquidity supply lead to drops in employment, output and consumption.
JEL Classification: E40, E50, F30, G15
Keywords: global imbalances, cash in advance, liquidity constraints,
financial integration, instability, exchange rate manipulation
3.1 Introduction
When firms are liquidity constrained, there are opportunities for liquidity suppliers to
extract rents. In this paper I explore the implications of this in a global equilibrium
context, in which some fast-growing regions are liquidity constrained while other re-
gions are at their steady state and are able to supply liquidity. The model predicts
119
an increasing flow of goods from the constrained region to the unconstrained region,
consistent with "global imbalances". From a normative perspective, this model sug-
gests that financial integration is welfare-reducing for the constrained regions, but
beneficial for the unconstrained regions.
I consider a monetary model in which there is a cash in advance constraint on
employing production inputs, which I refer to as a liquidity constraint. In the closed
economy, a binding liquidity constraint offers a positive rate of return on holding cash,
guaranteeing that firms will be willing to carry cash from one period to the next. A
feature of this model is that faster-growing economies will be more constrained in
equilibrium, in the sense that the marginal product of inputs is higher relative to
their price.
I study the effects of financial integration between a fast growing constrained
economy and a steady state rest of the world. Financial integration is assumed to
be limited in the sense that only short term borrowing and lending from abroad is
permitted: firms can borrow within a period to bridge the gap between production
expenses and sales, but households cannot borrow across periods to smooth con-
sumption. In the integrated environment, the returns to holding cash are pinned
down by the rest of the world at a relatively low level. Given their increasing con-
sumption path, domestic shareholders are no longer willing to hold cash at the low
rate of return. Thus, in equilibrium, the financing of production expenses is done
entirely through foreign liquidity. The rents paid to foreign liquidity suppliers reduce
equilibrium consumption compared to the closed economy equilibrium. Further, the
economy's production becomes entirely reliant on foreign liquidity supply, which may
be source of instability.
The mechanics of this model are close to Eden [2011b]. In Eden [2011b], I consider
a closed economy with liquidity constraints in which the price of production inputs in
terms of liquidity is determined in equilibrium. The equilibrium determination of this
price is the key ingredient in both models. There are two main differences between
this paper and Eden [2011b]: first, the focus of the two papers is different. Here, I
focus on the welfare implications of financial integration and on global imbalances.
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In Eden [2011b] I focus on the general equilibrium costs of financial intermediation in
a closed economy context. Second, this paper extends Eden [2011b] by endogenizing
the liquidity supply in the context of a dynamic, monetary model. In Eden [2011b],
I consider a single-period model in which liquidity is given exogenously. Here, I
demonstrate how a binding liquidity constraint can arise in equilibrium, and how it
changes following financial integration.
This model implies an increasing flow of goods from constrained economies to the
liquidity supplying regions. This model of "global imbalances" is most closely related
to the equilibrium view in Caballero et al. [20081, in which financial frictions lead to
a permanent flow of savings towards economies with better savings facilities. While
the essence of the financial friction is similar - inability to pledge future output - the
implications are quite distinct. In Caballero et al. [2008], the driving force behind the
global imbalances is the demand for savings from emerging economies. In contrast,
in this model, while the central bank ends up accumulating foreign reserves, there is
no demand for savings. In fact, if they had access to long term international borrow-
ing and lending, domestic agents would choose to borrow to smooth consumption.
The accumulation of foreign reserves is just an artifact of the increasing demand for
converting foreign into domestic currency in order to be able to supply liquidity to
domestic producers.
There are other papers in which agents face endogenous borrowing constraints,
such as Holmstrom and Tirole [1997] and, more recently in the context of financial
integration, Korinek [2010]. In these papers, borrowing constraints result from a
moral hazard problem and incomplete enforcement. Here, while it is assumed that
future output is not pledgable and inputs must be purchased with cash, enforcement
does not play an important role. Rather, the binding cash in advance constraint is
necessary in order for people to be willing to hold cash across periods. In contrast
to this literature, a binding liquidity constraint does not necessarily imply a loss of
welfare. This paper provides an alternative model for binding liquidity constraints,
that is immune to the critique in Aiyagari [1994] that, in a dynamic model, liquidity
constraints vanish in the long run as firms accumulate capital.
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This paper is also related to the literature on cash in advance constraints in the
productive sector, such as Stockman [1981] or Abel [1985]. Most closely related to this
paper is Neumeyer and Perri [2005], who consider an open economy with a "working
capital" constraint which requires that part of the wage bill must be financed with
foreign credit. This paper endogenizes this restriction in a model in which there is a
cash in advance constraint on hiring labor. In equilibrium firms must rely on foreign
liquidity suppliers for cash.
Finally, this paper is broadly related to the literature on the distributional impli-
cations of opening to trade and the welfare implications of liberalization. Bhagwati
and Brecher [1980] present the idea that in the presence of foreign-owned inputs of
production, trade liberalization can decrease domestic welfare if it increases the rela-
tive wage of the inputs that are disproportionately owned by foreigners. In this model,
the distributional implications of liberalization go in the opposite direction: financial
integration increases the return to domestic labor, while it lowers the return to liq-
uidity that can be supplied by foreigners. However, welfare decreases as the economy
imports liquidity in equilibrium, despite the fact that the economy's liquidity needs
can be satisfied in autarky at no aggregate cost. The distributional implications of
financial integration are in the spirit of Antras and Caballero [2009]: the returns to
liquidity decline, as liquidity can be imported more cheaply from abroad, allowing la-
bor to absorb a higher share of output. However, in contrast to Antras and Caballero
[2009], the net surplus of the economy declines. The key difference is that liquidity is
not a real factor of production, in the sense that importing liquidity does not allow
the economy to expand its production.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 3.2, I illustrate the main
insights using a single period real model, where liquidity constraints are assumed ex-
ogenous. In section 3.3, I endogenize the liquidity constraints in a dynamic monetary
model. In section 3.4 I solve for the closed economy equilibrium. In section 3.5 I
consider the implication of financial integration. I show that financial integration
is associated with lower consumption. In section 3.6 I explore the implications for
the current account. In section 3.7 I show that the integrated equilibrium is one in
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which the domestic economy is vulnerable to shocks to foreigner's willingness to sup-
ply liquidity, and demonstrate that the central bank has an incentive to depreciate
the currency in such an event. In section 3.8 I conclude.
3.2 Single Period Real Model
I begin by illustrating the main insights using a simplified single period real model.
There is a unit measure of households and,a unit measure of firms. Each household
supplies L units of labor inelastically. Each household owns a share of the productive
sector. The technology is given by pF(Le), where L' is employed labor and F(.) is
an increasing function with diminishing returns (F'(.) > 0, F"(-) < 0).
At the beginning of the period, each firm is endowed with Q units of current output
which will be referred to as liquidity. Firms can trade in liquidity. The amount of
liquidity demanded by firm i (in addition to its endowment) is denoted Qd, where
Qd can be positive or negative. The total amount of liquidity held by the firm at the
beginning of the period is therefore Q + Q'.
The price of liquidity is set in terms of output at the end of the period: one unit
of liquidity at the beginning of the period costs 1 + r units of the final good, to be
delivered after production takes place. Under autarky, r""u is set such that the market
for liquidity clears; in the open economy, it is assumed that r is exogenously fixed by
the rate of return to liquidity in global markets.
Denote by L' the amount of labor employed by firm i, and let w be the equilibrium
wage.
3.2.1 The Unconstrained Benchmark
Before adding the liquidity constraint, it is useful to consider the benchmark of the
unconstrained economy. In the unconstrained economy, the firm's problem is:
max pF(L') + Q + Qd - (1 + raut )Qd - wLe (3.1)
Le Qd
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In equilibrium, firms choose labor such that the marginal product of labor is equal
to the wage. By symmetry, labor market clearing implies that L' = L for all i. The
wage is therefore given by:
w = pF'(L') = pF'(L) (3.2)
Under autarky, liquidity market clearing implies that r""' = 0: otherwise, if ro <
0, firms demand an infinite amount of liquidity; if raut > 0 firms want to supply an
infinite amount of liquidity. Having r"' = 0 guarantees that each firm demands 0
additional units of liquidity (Q = 0).
As the entire labor force is employed in equilibrium, and the marginal product of
labor is equated across firms, output is equal to pF(L). Output is distributed both
as wages and as dividends and is consumed in its entirety.
Dividends are given by:
d = pF(L) + Q - wL (3.3)
The first best level of consumption is therefore given by:
CFB =wL+d =wL+ pF(L)+Q -wL = pF(L)+Q (3.4)
Note that the unconstrained economy necessarily gains from financial integration.
To see this, note that the derivative of the firm's problem with respect to Qd is -r. If
r > 0, firms would export liquidity at an arbitrarily large amount, resulting in large
profits. If r < 0, firms would import liquidity at an arbitrarily large amount. Profits
would be arbitrarily large in either case. If - = 0, prices remain at their autarkic
level; the economy therefore (weakly) gains form financial integration, regardless of
the international rate of return to liquidity.
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3.2.2 The Constrained Economy
I continue by describing the equilibrium in the constrained economy, in which labor
inputs must be purchased in advance of production.
Firms must purchase labor with liquidity; the amount of labor employed by firm
i must satisfy:
wLe < Q + Qd (3.5)
Firms therefore face the following optimization problem:
max pF(L) + Q + Qd - (1 + r)Q - wLe (3.6)
s.t.
wL' < Q + Qd (3.7)
The equilibrium under autarky. It turns out that for p sufficiently large, the
liquidity constraint (equation 3.7) is binding in equilibrium. The following lemma
will be useful in deriving this result:
Lemma 15 Under autarky, the liquidity constraint (equation 3.7) is binding if and
only if raut > 0. If the liquidity constraint is not binding, rat = 0.
The proof of this lemma, together with other omitted proofs, is in the appendix.
Claim 4 For p sufficiently large, the liquidity constraint is binding in equilibrium.
To prove this claim, I will show that a 0 rate of return on liquidity (raut = 0) will
generate excess demand for liquidity. As, by Lemma 15, raut = 0 is the only rate of
return consistent with an unconstrained equilibrium, it will follow that the liquidity
constraint must bind in equilibrium.
Consider the firm's problem above, holding the wage w constant, and assuming
that raut = 0. Ignoring the liquidity constraint, the firm would like to set the marginal
product of labor equal to the wage. Note that the marginal product of labor is
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increasing in p - thus, the higher p, the more labor the firm wants to hire. For p
sufficiently large the liquidity constraint is binding for Q' = 0, that is:
pF'(L= -) > w (3.8)
w
The amount of labor L' = 3 is the maximum amount of labor that the firm can hire
given its liquidity endowment. Thus, for any given w, for a sufficiently high p the
rate of return r""u - 0 generates excess demand for liquidity. Thus, in equilibrium, it
must be the case that r"t" > 0 and that the liquidity constraint is binding.
Consider next the equilibrium determination of the wage w. Whenever the firm's
liquidity constraint is binding, the wage w is determined by the aggregate liquidity
constraint, that is:
wL Q - w = L (3.9)
L
From the analysis of the firm's problem, for any given w the liquidity constraint is
binding for a sufficiently large p. Thus, for p sufficiently large, the liquidity constraint
binds for w = 2. In this case, the liquidity constraint is binding in equilibrium, as
the wage is determined by the aggregate liquidity constraint and - given that wage -
all firms use their entire liquidity endowment to purchase labor.
The price of liquidity is determined in equilibrium to assure that the market for
liquidity clears. The price of liquidity is equal to the additional revenue that it
generates. An additional unit of liquidity can buy I units of labor; each unit of laborw
produces pF'(L) units of output. The price of liquidity is therefore given by:
+,aut =pF'(L) -pF'(L)L (.0
want Q
It turns out that despite the fact that the liquidity constraint is binding, output
is still at its first best level. To see this, consider the problem of a planner trying to
maximize output:
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1
yFB = max (3.11)
s.t.11(.2 10
Ledi < L (3.12)
Given the assumption that F(-) is increasing and concave, the solution to this
problem is that output is maximized when the economy is at full employment and
the marginal product of labor is equated across firms.
These conditions are satisfied in the constrained economy. As labor is supplied
inelastically, the entire labor force is employed in equilibrium. The fact that there is
a market for liquidity guarantees that the marginal product of labor is equated across
firms: all firms equate the return to liquidity with its price':
F'(Li) = 1± + u r" > F'(Le) = F'(Le) (3.13)
w
In this model, output is at its first best level, and consumption is therefore also
at its first best level. To see this, denote dividend income by d. In the autarkic
equilibrium, d is given by aggregate output plus the initial liquidity endowment, net
of the wage bill:
d = pF(L)+Q -wL (3.14)
Consumption is given by:
caut =.wL + d = wL + (pF(L) + Q - wL) = pF(L) + Q = CFB (3.15)
To conclude, under autarky the presence of the liquidity constraint has no effect
on welfare. Consumption is at its first best level, as inflated dividend income exactly
offsets the effect of depressed labor income.
'The assumption that firms have identical technologies and identical liquidity endowments is
not important for this result. It is easy to show that the result generalizes to settings in which
the liquidity endowments Qj are bounded away from 0 (Qj > c > 0 for all i) and F (-) changes
continuously across i in the bounded set i E [0, 1].
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Financial integration. In contrast to the unconstrained case, when the economy
is constrained financial integration can decrease equilibrium welfare. Consider the
implications of having the constrained economy open to international liquidity flows.
Assume that the return to liquidity on global markets is pinned down by 1 + r, where
1 + r is small compared to the return to liquidity in the closed economy but still
greater than 12:
pF'(L)at =FL 1+ r"ul > 1 + r > 1 (3.16)
Claim 5 Financial integration reduces domestic consumption.
As long as pF'(L) > 1+ r, there are rents from supplying liquidity to constrainedw
firms. Thus, the wage appreciates until pF'(L) = 1 +r. The higher wage bill is financed
by foreign liquidity supply. Denote the equilibrium supply of foreign liquidity by Q*.
The wage bill now satisfies:
wL = Q+Q* (3.17)
Similarly to the autarkic equilibrium, output is still at its first best level. However,
welfare declines as equilibrium consumption is lower. This is because some of the
output has to be paid as rents to foreign liquidity suppliers:
d = pF(L) + Q + Q* - wL - (1 + r)Q* (3.18)
c=wL+d=wL+(pF(L)+Q+Q* -wL -(1+r)Q*) (3.19)
= pF(L) + Q - rQ* < c"" (3.20)
Financial integration reduces equilibrium consumption because constrained firms
fail to internalize the effect of their borrowing on the equilibrium wage. From the
perspective of each firm faced with a tight liquidity constraint, the prospect of bor-
rowing cheaply from abroad to finance the purchase of more labor is an attractive
one. However, as all labor is already employed, this activity only bids up the price
2When this condition is violated, the constrained economy will gain from financial integration.
However., in section 3.3 it will be shown that this condition will be satisfied in equilibrium for
relatively fast-growing economies.
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of labor. As the wage bill becomes unaffordable to the domestic productive sector,
some of the returns to labor must be paid as rents to foreign liquidity suppliers.
This model also admits to the following features:
" Global imbalances. Note that this model predicts a net flow of goods from
constrained economies to foreign liquidity suppliers of the amount of (1 +r)Q* -
Q= rQ*. This "global imbalance" is a result of equilibrium rents from sup-
plying liquidity to constrained economies.
From the government's perspective, there is an incentive to issue new liquidity
to crowd out foreign liquidity supply. In the monetary economy, it will be shown
that if the central bank can issue currency that is not backed by foreign reserves,
it can improve welfare by distributing liquidity directly to firms. However, this
policy will not be sufficient to eliminate global imbalances: the rents paid to
foreigners will still be positive even under the optimal policy.
" Instability associated with financial integration. In the integrated equi-
librium, the productive sector relies on foreign liquidity supply in order to fi-
nance the wage bill. This implies that, if wages are sticky, a sudden reluctance
of foreigners to supply liquidity will induce a drop employment. To illustrate
this, assume that the interest rate at which foreigners are willing to lend jumps
to r' > r, and that w = wb is constant at its "no shock" equilibrium level. Em-
ployment must drop so that L' satisfies pF'(L) = 1 +r'. Drops in output and
consumption will follow as well.
Given this shock, the government has an incentive to increase employment by
depreciating the currency, thereby making domestic labor effectively cheaper to
foreigners. The price of one unit of labor in terms of foreign currency is y, where
e is the exchange rate. The domestic rate of return is therefore pF'(Le)e 1+ r'.
w
By increasing e, the government can induce higher employment.
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3.3 A Dynamic Monetary Model of Liquidity Con-
straints
The key novel ingredient in this model is the equilibrium determination of the price
of production inputs in terms of liquidity. The relevance of this mechanism there-
fore depends on the equilibrium determination of liquidity and how it responds to
changes in the environment. In this section I construct a monetary model in which
liquidity is the amount of money held by firms at the production stage. Both in the
closed economy and in the integrated equilibrium, binding liquidity constraints are a
necessary feature of the environment.
I consider a discrete time infinite horizon model, where time periods are indexed
by t = 1, 2,....
Labor supply. There is a unit measure of households that supply L units of labor
inelastically each period. I assume for simplicity that labor is the only input of
production.
Technology. The production technology in period 0 is given by FO(L), where FO > 0
and FO' < 0. I assume constant productivity growth, governed by p > 1:
Ft(-) = p'Fo(.) (3.21)
Productive sector. There is a competitive productive sector, composed of a unit
measure of identical firms. Firms hire workers to produce final consumption goods.
At t = 0, each firm is endowed with M0 units of domestic currency. At time t + 1,
the money supply is given by some Mt±i that is determined by the central bank. At
the beginning of each period, the additional units of money are equally distributed
among firms by a helicopter. Each firm gets T units of money at time t, where:
T = M - Mt_1 (3.22)
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There is a market for cash. The price of 1 unit of cash at the beginning of period
t is set at 1 + 7rt units of output at the end of period t. Denote by Qi,t the money
holding of firm i carried over from time t - 1, and by Qdt the amount of liquidity
demanded by firm i at the beginning of period t (given the price rt).
At the beginning of period t (for t > 1), firm i's money holdings are:
Mi't = Qi,t + Qd + Te (3.23)
There is a cash in advance constraint on hiring labor. In other words, the amount
of labor employed by firm i must satisfy the following condition:
wtLit < Mji, (3.24)
Where I' denotes the labor employed by firm i at time t, Mi,t is the money
holdings of firm i at time t and wt denotes the nominal wage at time t.
The nominal price of goods at time t, denoted pt, is taken as given by the firms.
Consumers purchase goods with cash at the equilibrium price (implicitly, there is a
cash in a advance constraint on consumption as well).
As revenues are generated, firms decide whether to hold on to cash in order to
be able to make use of it in the next period, or whether to distribute the cash as
dividends. In equilibrium, within a period, money will be transferred back and forth
between firms and households multiple times: first, firms will transfer their money to
households as wage bills. Households will use their wage bills to buy products; this will
generate some revenue, which, given the initial high marginal utility of consumption,
share holders will decide to distribute as dividends. At the end of the period, when the
marginal utility of consumption of shareholders is sufficiently low, firms will decide
not to distribute dividends and rather use the revenues as cash reserves.
Menu costs. I assume that changing prices is socially costly. In period t + 1, the
output cost of changing the equilibrium price from pt to Pt+i is given by ',(Pt,Pt+1),
where K(pt,pt+1) = c > 0 for Pt # Pt+1 and K (pt,pt+1) = 0 for Pt = Pt+1. I assume for
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simplicity that this cost is incurred by consumers in a lump-sum fashion at time t.
Assuming some form of menu costs is necessary in order to guarantee that the
central bank's optimal policy is to insure price stability. Otherwise, there are multiple
equilibria3
Households. The utility of households is given by:
00
U(cO, ci, c 2 ...) = E 'tu(ct) (3.25)
t=0
Where u(-) takes the form:
1-6u(c) 1 -(3.26)
I assume that p-9 < 1. This assumption will be necessary to assure that utility
takes a finite value in the autarkic equilibrium (in which consumption equals output
and hence grows at a rate p).
Each household owns one productive firm. I assume that the agent indexed i owns
the firm indexed i. Households consume their wage bill and their dividends, minus
the cost of the price change:
ptci,t = wtL + di,t - K (PtPt+i) (3.27)
Pt
Implicitly, it is assumed that household i cannot supply its own labor to firm
I . Otherwise, the cash in advance constraint would be nonsensical, as households
could supply their own labor to the firms that they own and "pay themselves" later
with dividends. The cash in advance constraint captures a reality in which produc-
tion inputs are differentiated, and production requires the purchase of a variety of
production inputs sold in a market setting.
3 In the absence of a menu cost assumption, any sequence of money supply can achieve the first
best level. This result changes if we assume that labor supply is elastic. In this case, in the absence
of menu costs, the optimal sequence of money supplies implements the Friedman rule (Friedman
[1969]).
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The central bank. The central bank pre-commits to a sequence of money supplies,
(M 1 , M 2 ...) (I assume that MO is given). The aim of the central bank is to maximize
household utility.
3.4 Closed Economy Equilibrium
In the closed economy equilibrium, liquidity constraints are binding in the sense that
the marginal product of labor is higher than the real wage. This is because firms
will agree to carry cash reserves only if there is a high enough return to money. The
liquidity constraints will be more binding for economies that are growing at a faster
rate. However, despite the fact that liquidity constraints may be very binding, output
and consumption are still at their first best level.
Definition 3 An equilibrium of the closed economy is a sequence of prices (po, pi, ...),
a sequence of rates of return on liquidity (ro,r1,...), a sequence of nominal wages
(wo, wi,...), a sequence of employed labor {(L' 0 , L' 1 ,...)}iE[O,1], a sequenCe of out-
puts (YO, Yi, ... ), a sequence of cash holdings {(Qj,o, Q,1 ... )}iE[o,1], a sequence of liq-
uidity demands {(QO, Qi 1 , ... )}i[O,1], a sequence of firms' initial money holdings
{(M,o, A, 1 , ... )}jE[o,1]a sequence of money supplies (Mo, M1 ,...) and a sequence of
consumptions {(cio, ci 1 , ... )}i[o,1] that jointly satisfy the following conditions:
1. Given the wage and the price sequences, the consumption sequence, the labor
sequence, and the cash sequence solve the optimization problem of agent i:
00
max #3 Otu(cit) (3.28)
ctit,Qi,t+1,Qi,t t=O
s. t.
ptci,t = wtL + di,, _ (ptPt+) (3.29)
di,t = ptFt(Le) + Mi,t - wtLe - Qi,t+1- (1 + rt)Qdt (3.30)
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wtLi <; M,t (3.31)
Mi,t+1 = Qi,t+1 + Qi,41 + T. 1  (3.32)
Where Tt - Mt - Al- 1, and Mo,j - Mo.
2. Goods market clearing condition:
Y = pF(L',t)di = ci,di + I(pt,pt+1) (3.33)0o 0
3. Labor market clearing condition:
L edi =L (3.34)
4. Money market clearing condition:
j1
SA,tdi = t(335)
5. The sequence (M1 , M2,...) maximizes household utility.
It will be useful to compare the properties of this equilibrium to the first best of
this economy, where the "first best" refers to the unconstrained benchmark without
the liquidity constraint and without menu costs.
Lemma 16 Consumption is at its first best level if and only if prices are stable.
Proof: If the liquidity constraint is not binding, each firm sets the marginal product
of labor to be equal to the wage. If the liquidity constraint is binding, then each
firm sets F -(L)= 1 + rt. Thus, output is at its first best level, as the economyWt
is at full employment and the marginal product of labor is equated across firms.
If pt = pt_1, then K(pt,pt+1) = 0 and consumption is equal output; in this case,
consumption is at its first best level. If pt # pt-I, consumers have to incur some
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menu costs, so consumption is less than output, and hence less than the first
best level.
A corollary of this lemma is that the central bank would like to choose (M 1 , A 2 , ---)
in a way that achieves price stability.
The following proposition characterizes the closed economy equilibrium:
Proposition 9 There exists a unique equilibrium. In equilibrium, the liquidity con-
straint is binding for all t: 1 + ra t -F(L)
The intuition is as follows. The consumer-shareholder's Euler equation is given
by:
1 , # , Pt+1 Fj+1 (L) (.6
-u (ct) = -- u (ct+) ) (3.36)
Pt Pt+i Wt+1
The term pt+Ft+ (L) is the additional revenue generated in period I + 1 from carrying
Wt+1
over one more unit of currency. This unit of currency can hire 1 units of labor;
Wt+1
each unit of labor produces at the margin a revenue of pt+1Ft+1 (L).
In equilibrium, the central bank chooses a sequence of money supplies that assures
price stability. Thus, pt = pt+1, and, by Lemma 16, ct F(L). Thus, the Euler
equation can be rewritten as:
n'(Ft(L)) = #u'(Ft+1(L))Pt+1Ft+1(L (3.37)
7Dt+1
From this, it is straightforward to conclude that firms are constrained in equilibrium,
in the sense that the marginal product of labor is higher than the wage:
A__t_1(L_ u'(Ft (L)) 
_> 1 (3.38)
Wt+1 #u'(Ft+1(L))
Thus, firms are constrained in equilibrium and use their entire money holdings to
hire labor.
Similar to the model in section 3.2, there is a positive relation between the growth
rate of the economy and the equilibrium rate of return on liquidity. From equation
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3.38:
at pt+1FlI(L) u'(Ft(L)) FtL_- _ p01+ ,at7 (3.39)
Wt+1 /u'(pFt(L)) - (pFt(L)) - (
Faster growing economies (higher p) are more liquidity constrained in the sense
that the ratio of the marginal product of labor and the wage is higher. This is because
higher output growth leads to higher consumption growth; the marginal utility of
consumption therefore declines more rapidly, and firms require a higher rate of return
on money to be willing to carry over money from one period to the next.
3.5 Integrated Equilibrium
Consider the following global equilibrium environment. There is a large "developed"
economy that is at its steady state level of output (p = 1). The central bank im-
plements the optimal policy and chooses a constant price level. In this economy, the
within period return to holding cash is given by (by equation 3.39 with p = 1):
+ r -t(L) 1 (3.40)
I normalize the price of goods in terms of international currency to be p = 1.
In this global environment, I assume a small open economy that grows at rate p >
1. The exchange rate is fixed at 1 and the central bank follows a 100% reserve ratio.
Later I will show that abandoning the reserve requirement can increase equilibrium
welfare. The initial supply of domestic currency at time 0 is Mo. At time t, the
amount of domestic currency is determined by the demand for domestic currency
given domestic wages and the fixed exchange rate. The price of goods in terms of the
foreign currency is constant at pt = 1. This implies that the economy incurs no menu
costs due to price changes.
I assume that borrowing is limited in the following sense. Agents can borrow and
lend only within a period; if agents borrow, they must repay whatever they borrow at
the end of the period. This structure will imply that domestic firms will borrow for
liquidity purposes, but households will not be able to borrow to smooth consumption
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across time.
Given the assumption that the price of goods is constant, the only feasible equilib-
rium is the constrained equilibrium, in which the between-periods return on holding
cash is 0, and the within-period return on holding cash is 1 + r:
F'(L)= 1 +r (3.41)
Wt
Definition 4 An equilibrium of the integrated economy is a sequence of nominal
wages (wo, w1 , ...), a sequence of employed labor {(L' 0 , L 1, ...)}iE[O,1], a sequence of
outputs (Yo, Yi,...), a sequence of domestic cash holdings {(QiO, Qi, ...)}iE[o,1], a se-
quence of liquidity demands {(Qo, Qfi, ... )}iE[0,1], a sequence of foreign liquidity sup-
ply (QO, Q*, ... ) and a sequence of consumptions {(ci,o, ci,1 , ...)}i[o,1] that jointly satisfy
the following conditions:
1. Given the wage sequence, the consumption sequence, the labor sequence, and the
cash sequence solve:
00
max Z E tu(cit) (3.42)
s. t.
cit = wtL + di,t (3.43)
di,t = F(Let) + Q,,t + Q t - we - Qi,t+1 - (1 + r)Qd (3.44)
wtL < Q , + Qd (3.45)
Qi,o = MO is given.
2. Goods market clearing condition:
Y j pFt(Le)di = ci,tdi + rQ* (3.46)
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3. Labor market clearing condition:
L e di = L (3.47)
4. Liquidity market clearing condition:
jQ t di Q* (3.48)
Proposition 10 For MO sufficiently small:
1. In the financially integrated economy, firms always hold 0 cash reserves.
2. Financial integration reduces equilibrium consumption: ct < cut for all t.
Note that firms will agree to hold cash only as long as:
U'(ct) < #u'(ct+i)(1 + r) = u'(ct+1) (3.49)
It turns out that this condition is violated in equilibrium, as the economy expe-
riences positive consumption growth which it is unable to smooth. Firms therefore
choose to hold 0 cash reserves, and are always constrained in equilibrium. As in the
simple example in section 3.2, financial integration creates a dependence on foreign
liquidity supply as the wage bill appreciates. In this dynamic setting, there is an ad-
ditional effect: not only are wages higher, but the equilibrium choice of cash reserves
is lower, further increasing the reliance of foreign liquidity supply and the equilibrium
rents absorbed by foreign liquidity suppliers.
As in the simple example, the equilibrium inefficiency results from the fact that
constrained entrepreneurs do not internalize the effects of their borrowing decisions
on the equilibrium wage. From the perspective of each firm, the wage is depressed so
borrowing from foreigners is profitable. However, collectively, firms would be better
off if borrowing from foreigners was restricted. Dividends would be higher, both
because wages would be lower and because there would be no payment to foreign
liquidity suppliers.
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From the worker's perspective, financial integration is beneficial, as it increases
the real wage. In this model, the negative effect on dividends more than offsets this
effect, resulting in overall lower consumption. This model therefore suggests that
financial integration is associated with a redistribution of surplus from capital owners
(firms) to workers, that cannot be corrected by redistribution.
3.6 Global Imbalances
In the integrated equilibrium, despite the fact that agents would like to borrow, the
central bank accumulates foreign reserves over time, and the economy runs a trade
deficit.
The current account is given by:
CAt = (1 + r)Q* - Q* = rQ* (3.50)
Note that:
= 1+_r = wt L = wtL (3.51)
Wt 1+ r 1+r
As foreign liquidity supply finances the entire wage bill, by equation 3.51,
w(L =Q)* L = wtL Q* (3.52)
The current account in period t is therefore:
CAt (L)L (3.53)
1 + r-
Assuming the functional form Ft = AL', we have that F|(L)L = aF(L). Rewrit-
ing the equation above,
raFt(L) CA _ ra
C±At = FL = (3.54)1 + r- F (L) 1 + r-
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To calibrate the current account surplus implied by this equation, I choose r to be
equal to the US prime rate (taken from the St. Luis Fed's FRED database) plus 3%.
This choice is roughly consistent with the return on risky productive lending. The
choice of a is more tricky: a need not be interpreted necessarily as the labor share,
but rather as the share of inputs that must be purchased in advance of production. I
choose a = 0.6, based on estimates of the credit share in production in Evans et al.
[2002]4.
China's Current Account as a Percent of GDP:
Levels
12 - -- -----. - - - - - - -
10
10
8. .......
-Data I
Model
2...........--- ............ ...........
0~ ~ 0 -t to_ ~- .~
-2 . .
Figure 3-1: The Chinese current account as a percent of gdp.
Figure 3-1 plots the current account predicted by the model and the actual Chinese
current account between the years 1990 and 2010 (both as a percent of GDP). The
model predicts a current account surplus of between 2%-6%. This range falls well
4 Evans et al. [2002] use a panel of 82 countries covering 21 years to estimate a translog production
function., and find the share of credit to be around 0.6. An alternative estimate can be found in
Khan and Ahmad [1985], that estimates the share of money in the production function to be 0.43
in the manufacturing sector in Pakistan.
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Figure 3-2: The Chinese current account as a percent of gdp: first differences on an
annual frequency.
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within the range of the actual Chinese current account, which is between -2% and
10%. It is possible that the larger range can be accounted for by time varying risk
premia on Chinese short-term borrowing'. Note further that, on a yearly frequency,
the increases in the current account predicted by the model roughly coincide with
those observed in the data (see figure 3-2). Of course, on a lower frequency, the
relationship seems to be failing as the Chinese current account is increasing while the
current account predicted by the model is slightly downward trending.
3.6.1 Optimal Policy
Interestingly, the central bank accumulates foreign reserves, despite the fact that
domestic consumers would like to borrow. To see this, note that the demand for
domestic currency is increasing over time: the demand for domestic currency at
time t is given by Q*, which, from the analysis above, is increasing at a rate p.
The central bank therefore has to print new currency every period, and accumulates
foreign reserves.
Note that the analysis above was done under the assumption that the central bank
must follow a fixed exchange rate regime with a reserve ratio of 1. A central bank
which lacks credibility and is vulnerable to attacks will therefore be forced to accu-
mulate cash reserves. The central bank may choose to use these cash reserves to buy
liquid low-risk assets such as treasuries; the interest on treasuries can be distributed
to domestic agents immediately without compromising the reserve ratio. Will the
treasuries ever be redeemed? This depends on whether the central bank continues to
be vulnerable to attacks forever. It is possible that over time, the central bank will
acquire credibility and will no longer need to back its currency with the international
currency. At that point, the central bank will find it optimal to stop accumulating
bonds. In this sense, the US current account deficit can be seen as -unsustainable".
'See Broner et al. [Forthcoming] for evidence that time varying risk premia plays an important
role in determining emerging market borrowing rates. This mechanism may potentially help account
for the large discrepancy between the model and the data during the recent crisis, in which interest
rates were held very low, but firms experienced difficulty acquiring credit. The short term borrowing
rate faced by Chinese firms may be badly proxied by the US prime lending rate.
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If, at some point, the Chinese government acquires sufficient credibility to have an
unbacked currency, the demand for US treasuries will decline.
Two questions arise: first, can the central bank increase welfare by abandoning the
commitment to a 100% reserve ratio? Second, can the central bank further improve
welfare by moving to a flexible exchange rate regime?
The answer to the first question is yes: the central bank can increase welfare if
it is able to commit to a fixed exchange rate without a 100% reserve ratio. To see
this, note that given a fixed exchange rate, the amount of domestic currency at time
t must be equal to the demand for domestic currency in the 100% reserve ratio case
analyzed above, denoted Q*:
t*-Ft' (L) L ( 5
1 + r
The amount of domestic currency therefore must grow at a rate p. Assume that
the only restriction on the central bank is that it must have a positive reserve ratio (it
cannot hold a negative amount of foreign currency). At the end of period t, foreigners
hold Q* units of domestic currency. At the beginning of time t + 1, the central bank
can improve welfare by distributing the new units of currency directly to domestic
firms, without backing it by foreign reserves.
Firms will receive Q*1 - Q* units of currency, thereby absorbing a fraction -- of
the rents to liquidity supply at time t + 1. By following this policy every period, the
government can transfer P of the rents to liquidity supply to domestic agents. Notep
that this policy is consistent with a fixed exchange rate, as all equilibrium prices and
rates of return replicate the 100% reserve ratio case analyzed in the previous section.
Foreigners are therefore still willing to trade one unit of domestic currency for one
unit of foreign currency.
Note that under this policy, the reserve ratio will approach 0 as t -> oo. To see
this, note that if the central bank begins to implement this policy at time 1, the
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foreign reserves at any time t remain at Mo, so the reserve ratio is:
RR Mo_ Mo MO 4t-*oo 0 (3.56)
RR Ft(L) L ptFl(L)LF 1+r 1+r
Thus, a central bank trying to improve welfare by following this policy must be
sufficiently credible to be able to sustain a fixed exchange rate with effectively a 0
reserve ratio.
Can the central bank improve welfare further by abandoning the fixed exchange
rate regime and moving to a flexible exchange rate regime? Unfortunately, no. The
reason is as follows. For foreigners to be willing to hold a finite amount of domestic
currency between the end of period t and the beginning of period t + 1, it must be
the case that the exchange rate remains the same between these two dates. If it is
expected that the central bank will depreciate the currency, nobody will hold domestic
currency, as it is expected that it will be cheaper to purchase domestic currency at
the beginning of the next period. Similarly, if it is expected that the central bank will
appreciate the currency, everyone will want to hold domestic currency. The exchange
rate at the beginning of period t therefore must be equal to the exchange rate at the
end of the previous period.
Similarly, it must be the case that the within-period return on each unit of domes-
tic currency is 1 + r, by the international no arbitrage condition. Thus, if foreigners
hold Q* units of domestic currency at the beginning of time t + 1, by the end of
period t + 1 the economy must pay at least (1 + r)Q* units of output as rents to
foreigners. The best the central bank can do is therefore replicate the allocation of
the fixed exchange rate regime with no reserve requirement, and distribute the new
units of domestic currency directly to firms.
3.7 Instability
As the wage bill increases following financial integration, the economy becomes in-
creasingly reliant on foreign liquidity supply. Domestic firms are no longer able to
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afford the wage bill with their own money holdings. In the presence of some wage
stickiness, this means that the economy is particularly vulnerable to shocks to foreign
liquidity supply'.
I augment the model to allow for wage stickiness. Assume that at the time of finan-
cial integration, employers and workers contract on a sequence of wages, 7t, ....
The contracted wages are determined by the "no shock" equilibrium described in
section 3.5. Thus, the wage &t is characterized by the following international no-
arbitrage condition, that takes into account full employment of labor:
=i + r (3.57)Wt
Assume that there is a single period shock to the foreigners' willingness to supply
liquidity that leads the within-period borrowing rate to jump from r to r' > r.
As wages are sticky, this increase in the interest rate necessarily implies a drop in
production. The international no arbitrage condition is now given by:
=t(e 1+ r' > 1 +r = FtL -> Le < L (3.58)
Thus, unemployment increases and output drops. Consumption at time t drops as
well:
Lemma 17 Consumption drops following an increase in r.
It is easy to see that Qi,t+1 = 0, as borrowing conditions at t + 1 are expected
to go back to normal; firms therefore have no incentive to save, and will choose to
hold 0 cash reserves. Thus, consumption returns back to the no-shock equilibrium
benchmark. As consumption decreases in period t and returns to normal thereafter,
it can be concluded that the shock to the foreigners' willingness to lend reduces
equilibrium welfare.
6 This is potentially a realistic concern, as the literature suggests that foreign liquidity supply
to emerging economies is highly volatile (see Fostel and Geanakoplos [2008] and Eden [2011a] for
models).
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"Beggar thy neighbor" policies. Given a shock to the foreigners willingness to
lend, the government may have an incentive to depreciate the currency in order to
boost employment. To see this, note that the domestic return to a unit of foreign
currency is determined by the exchange rate et. A unit of labor costs g units ofet
foreign currency. The return to foreign currency is therefore equal to:
Ft'(Lte) FtL Le)
-= et. (3.59)
et
Consider a government that sets the exchange rate at et. Employment is then
given by the following international no arbitrage condition:
,F|'(Le)(+ r' = et & (3.60)
Lemma 18 Consumption at time t is maximized when et is chosen such that full
employment is restored.
Given a crisis, the central bank faces a tradeoff: on the one hand, a depreciation
may compromise the central bank's credibility. This is problematic as there are
welfare gains from the ability to institute a currency that is not backed by foreign
reserves. On the other hand, during a crisis, there is an incentive to renege on
the promise to hold the exchange rate fixed, as a depreciation can help restore full
employment.
3.8 Conclusion
The presence of binding liquidity constraints implies a transfer of surplus to liquidity
suppliers. In the closed economy, liquidity is supplied domestically so the presence
of liquidity constraints is welfare-neutral. However, in the integrated equilibrium,
binding liquidity constraints in a fast-growing economy imply a transfer of surplus to
foreign liquidity suppliers, thereby reducing domestic equilibrium welfare.
From a policy perspective, this model suggests that emerging economies have an
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incentive to discourage foreign liquidity supply, even if domestic entrepreneurs are
heavily constrained. Opening to capital flows will increase the supply of liquidity,
but this will only bid up the domestic input prices such as labor and land. This, in
turn, will make the domestic firms less liquidity constrained but more heavily reliant
on foreign liquidity supply. In a dynamic equilibrium, the lower return on holding
liquidity will imply that firms choose not to hold sufficient cash reserves to finance
their expenses, and rely heavily on foreigners to supply liquidity.
The integrated economy is therefore highly vulnerable to shocks to foreign liq-
uidity supply. In the presence of sticky input prices, a sudden shock to foreigner's
willingness to supply liquidity will result in an increase in unemployment and a drop
in output. The government therefore has an incentive to depreciate the domestic
currency, thereby providing a higher dollar rate of return and encouraging foreign
liquidity supply.
This temptation to depreciate the currency creates a certain tension. A central
bank that is sufficiently credible to maintain a fixed exchange rate that is not vulnera-
ble to attacks can increase domestic welfare, as it can distribute new currency directly
to domestic firms without backing it by foreign reserves. As long as this in done in
a manner consistent with the fixed exchange rate, it allows domestic firms to absorb
some of the rents to liquidity supply. A shock to foreigner's willingness to supply
liquidity therefore creates a tension between the short term gains of a depreciation
and the long term gains of central bank credibility.
An important thing to note is that, in this model, the driver of global imbalances
is the differences in growth rates: the fast-growing economy is liquidity constrained in
equilibrium, and the steady-state developed world is the equilibrium liquidity supplier.
This suggests that global imbalances are a temporary phenomenon: once the emerging
markets converge to the steady state growth level, we should see a balanced current
account. This suggests that, from the developed market's perspective, the rents from
supplying liquidity to emerging economies should be viewed as a "temporary" source
of income.
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3.9 Appendix
3.9.1 Proof of Lemma 15
If the liquidity constraint is not binding, firms set the marginal product of labor equal
to the wage. As in the unconstrained benchmark, the only rate of return on liquidity
that is consistent with market clearing is r"' = 0.
Assume next that the liquidity constraint is binding, that is, the weak inequality
in equation 3.7 holds with equality:
wL'- Q + Qd (3.61)
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The firm's optimization problem (equation 3.6) can the be rewritten as:
max pF( )-(1+ r)Qd (3.62)
Qq W
The first order condition with respect to Qd is:
=) 1L I + r (3.63)
w
It follows that r > 0: if r = 0, the marginal product of labor is equated with the
wage and the liquidity constraint is not binding. If r < 0, the marginal product of
labor exceeds the wage and this is never optimal.
It is left to show that when ro" > 0, the liquidity constraint is binding. This
follows from the fact that if the liquidity constraint is not binding, r""' 0 is the
only return consistent with market clearing in the liquidity market.
3.9.2 Proof of Proposition 9
In equilibrium, firms must be indifferent, given the price level, between holding on to
cash and and distributing cash as dividends. This can imply one of two equations,
depending on whether the liquidity constraint is binding at t + 1. I will consider first
the situation in which the liquidity constraint is binding. Substituting in wt+1Lt+1 =
Qt+1 + T+ 1, the Euler equation implies:
U (C = / (ct+ 1) '(L) (3.64)
Pt Pt+i wt+1
The left hand side is the marginal utility of households (share holders) generated
from receiving an additional unit of currency in this period. An additional unit of
currency can purchase } consumption goods, and the marginal utility of consumption
is U'(ct). The right hand side represents the marginal utility of households generated
from having firms hold an additional unit of cash as reserves. With an additional
unit of cash, firms can hire 1 more workers. Each worker generates an additional
Wt+1
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nominal revenue of pti1Fj+I(L). Each unit of cash in period t+1 can finance i units
Ptf1
of consumption, and the marginal utility of consumption is u'(ct+1). The marginal
utility of consumption next period is discounted by 3.
I conjecture that there exists a sequence (M 1 , M 2 ,...) that guarantees price sta-
bility. Under this conjecture, by Lemma 16, output is equal consumption and is at
its first best level. Substituting in the market clearing condition, ct = Yt, and the
condition that output is at its firs best level,
n'U(Yt) =_ Ou'(Yt+1) Ft+ 1(L) = uI(y)pFt(L) (3.65)
Pt Wti1 Wt+1
Substituting in the functional form for u(-), after some simple algebraic manipu-
lations:
pt F/~(L) _p 6
= -) - (3.66)
Note that in this environment, wtii = M-+1 . Thus,
plMt+1 peMt+1P = /Ft'+1(L)L - OpFt(L)L (3.67)
Thus, for price stability, Pt = Pt+1, and Mt+1 = pMt. Thus, the unique price
sequence Mt = ptMo guarantees price stability, and, from Lemma 16, this will be the
central bank's choice.
I have proved therefore that there is a unique equilibrium in which the liquidity
constraint is binding. It is left to show that there are no additional equilibria in which
the liquidity constraint does not bind. If the liquidity constraint is not binding at
t + 1, the Euler equation implies:
1 1
-U'(ct) ul'(Ct+i) (3.68)
Pt Pt+1
First, I show that given the price sequence Mt = ptMo, the unique equilibrium is
the constrained equilibrium. Then, I show that any unconstrained market equilibrium
is one in which welfare is suboptimal. I conclude that only way that the central bank
can implement the first best outcome is by choosing the money supply sequence
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Mt = P'Mo. In this case, there is a unique equilibrium in which consumption is at its
first best.
Assume therefore that Mt = p'. Assume in the way of contradiction that there
exists an unconstrained equilibrium in which there is price stability. Substituting in
the market clearing condition c = Y, and using the expressions for utility and output
growth, the following relation emerges:
Pti (3.69)
Pt P
Thus, price stability must be violated. It is left to show that there is no market
equilibrium in which there is no price stability. Assuming no price stability, the
market clearing condition implies that:
ct = Yt - r(pt, pt_1) = Yt - 1E (3.70)
Thus, from the Euler equation,
1 #3
--u'(p'Fo(L) - e) = n(pt+1Fo(L) - c) (3.71)
Pt pt+1
Pt+i u'(pt +1 Fo(L) - ) (3.72)
pt u'(ptFo(L) - c)
Denote:
U(pt+lFo(L) - ) (3.73)
u'(p tF(L) - c)
Note that 0 < 1 and pt+1 = Opt. Thus, real money balances (g) grow at ratePt
, whereas equilibrium consumption, for t large, grows at a rate equal approximately
to p. This is in violation of the transversality condition: agents accumulate money
reserves that they never use. From an individual standpoint, they can do better by
consuming more in every period and holding less money reserves. Thus, an uncon-
strained equilibrium in which money grows at rate p does not exist.
It is left to show that no unconstrained equilibrium can achieve the first best
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level of consumption. To see this, note that by equation 3.69, any unconstrained
equilibrium in which output is at its first best would require price deflation. By
Lemma 16, an economy with price deflation cannot be at its first best.
3.9.3 Proof of Proposition 10
Whether or not firms are borrowers or lenders at t = 0 depends on their liquidity
endowment. Specifically, firms are lenders if the following condition holds:
> 1 + r> (3.74)(wo1 = LMOF(L
Rewriting this condition,
F ( L )L
o > 1 +r (3.75)
This condition will be true for Mo sufficiently low. Note that here the liquidity
endowment MO has a real interpretation: the liquidity endowment is the amount of
foreign goods that domestic agents can purchase at time 0. For the firms to be net
borrowers, this must be small in comparison to the value of international goods that
they can produce. I am going to assume throughout that this is the case. Note that
this condition holds in the autarkic constrained equilibrium'.
Denote by Q* the amount of foreign borrowing of firms at time t. Consumption
at time t is given by:
ct = wtL + dt = wtL + Ft(L) + Qt - wtL - rQ* - Qt+1 (3.76)
ct = Ft(L) + Qt - rQ* - Qt+1 (3.77)
What is Q*? If the liquidity constraint binding, Q* + Qt = wtL. Thus, Q* -
wtL - Qt. Consumption can be rewritten as:
ct = F(L) + (1 + r)Qt - rwtL - Qt+1 (3.78)
71n the autarkic constrained equilibrium, by equation 3.39, P') . As 1+r = tjP'-')=Wt r 1
p6(1 + r)> 1 + r
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F(L) F(L) F|(L)L L
= (1 r) + = : I + = wtLWt 1+Fr 1+r
r Fj(L)L Q~
ct= Ft(L) + (1 + r)Qt- -Ft+11 + r
For t = 0, consumption is maximized for Q1 = 0. I conjecture that Qt = 0
for every t is an optimal choice whenever Qo = MO is sufficiently low.
conjecture,
rF'(L) LrlLL
ci = F1(L) - r )=L p(Fo(L) -r )1+Fr 1+Fr
For MO sufficiently small,
CO 0() (1+ )M -r Fl( L)L r1l )co = FO (L) +(+r) MO - r L< p(Fo(L) - Fo(L)L =c1+r 1+r
Thus, u'(co) > u'(ci), so firms are choosing optimally not to hold any cash and
to distribute all sales revenues as dividends. For periods t > 1, not holding cash
continues to be optimal, as consumption is given by:
rF|'(L)L rF__L_
c< = F(L) - < p(Ft(L) - ) = Ct+i (3.83)
1-Fr 1+r
Thus, in equilibrium, firms hold 0 cash reserves in all period, so the second part of
the proposition is proven.
The first part of the proposition, that consumption is lower for all t, is trivial for
t > 1, as:
r F|(L ) L
ct = Ft(L) - < Ft(L) = c""t
1 + r
(3.84)
For t = 0, this is true for a sufficiently small Qo:
co = Ft(L) + (1 + -r)Qo - F0(LL)1 r < Fo(L) = ca't
1 + r 0
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Note that:
Thus,
(3.79)
(3.80)
Under this
(3.81)
(3.82)
(3.85)
3.9.4 Proof of Lemma 17
Assume that r' > r, and that the wage is fixed at its "no shock" level it such that
FL) - 1 + r. Consumption after the shock is given by:tt
Qt+1 - r'Q* < F(L () - r'Q* (3.86)
(3.87)
Consider the function:
$(l) = Ft(l) - rttl (3.88)
Thus, we have that:
Ct < #(Le)t (3.89)
The maximum value that the function #(-) takes is at lma, that is determined by
the first order condition:
0'(l) = 0 => F'(l'm ) = ri (3.90)
= Ft(Le) - r'ibLe < Ft(L') - rihtL e
Note further that #"(lm") is negative:
#"//(lm") = Ft"(l"') - rbt < 0 (3.91)
Thus, for I < imax, #(.) is increasing in 1. Note that L < l'm, as:
F(L) = (1 + r)tb > rzb = F'(l'ax) = L < i1"" (3.92)
As L > Lt, both L and Lt are less than lr"". As #(-) is increasing in this range,
Ct < #(Le) < #(L) = Ft(L) - ribL = (3.93)
Where 6t is the level of consumption that domestic consumers would have in the
absence of the shock (that is, if the r was at its expected level).
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ct = wt L' + Ft (Li ) - wt Le
3.9.5 Proof of Lemma 18
Recall that the international no arbitrage condition is given by:
(3.94)
Note that a higher value of et corresponds to higher employment.
Let be given by:
1+ r' (3.95)
By choosing et, the government can control . Note that this is the real rate of
return that firms have to pay liquidity suppliers in equilibrium:
F(Le) (3.96)
Consumption is given by:
ct = Ft(L ) - Q* = Ft(L e) - ,CtLe
Ft(L;) - ( - 1)tvtL6 = Ft(Le) - Ft(L )L6 + 'tbL
(3.97)
(3.98)
Define the function 0(-) as:
$(l) = Ft(l) - Ft'(l)l + tdtd (3.99)
The derivative of 0(-) with respect to I is always positive:
(3.100)
Thus, it is optimal for the government to set et such that the economy is at full
employment.
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1+ r' = et FjL)
$'(I) = Ft|(1) - Ft"(1) 1 - Ft'(1) + 7t = - Ft"(1) 1 + IIt > 0
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